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10.20 Tobacco industry lobbying—the tools

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10.20.1 Tobacco industry sponsored consultants

The tobacco industry has long seen the advantage in financing and helping promote publicity for outspoken, media-savvy scientists who are prepared to challenge accepted views on smoking and health or various aspects of tobacco control, while appearing to be independent. Cooperation between the tobacco companies on a global scale has ensured that competent tobacco industry spokespeople have been shared.254-256 In Australia, it has been documented that at least nine visiting industry-sponsored scientists gained substantial publicity between 1969–1979, promoting a range of industry-friendly views debunking the health evidence about smoking. Over the years the views of these individuals were widely reported, often uncritically, by the news media. It is probable, given the timing and content of some of these publicity initiatives, that tobacco industry consultants adversely influenced the course of tobacco control initiatives in those early days.254

In the late 1970s and into the 1980s, the Australian tobacco industry cultivated a home-grown dissenter, Sydney general practitioner Dr William Whitby, who self-published two books (Smoking is good for you and The smoking scare de-bunked). Although there is evidence that the industry recognised that Dr Whitby's particular brand of pro-smoking fanaticism might pose a liability, it nonethless provided the means for his views to be widely disseminated and Whitby's works were retained in the armoury of international tobacco circles well into the 1990s.255

The tobacco industry adopted similar techniques in efforts to subvert the accumulating medical evidence on second-hand smoke, as well as deflecting attempts to introduce bans on tobacco advertising and other forms of regulation of tobacco products in Australia and internationally. For example Philip Morris and other international companies collaborated to promote the views of scientists holding views on SHS counter to those of mainstream health authorities throughout Asia, Europe and the USA during the 1980s and 1990s.172, 173, 256–258 During the 1980s BAT 'ghost-wrote' reports for JJ Boddewyn published by the International Advertising Association and designed to counter bans on tobacco advertising.259 The Boddewyn reports on advertising were widely circulated internationally (including in Australia260) and formed the basis of industry campaigns to oppose advertising bans.

10.20.2 Tobacco industry affiliated research foundations

The industry has established pseudo-scientific research foundations designed to give credibility to the notion that there remains controversy about the medical evidence on smoking on health. Funding research organisations has also allowed the tobacco industry to:173, 261-263

  • reap a public relations advantage from financing (apparently) independent research on smoking
  • demonstrate its dissention that smoking causes disease while appearing committed to finding 'solutions'
  • support research likely to produce outcomes advantageous to industry objectives, (including 'inconclusive' research showing that yet more research is needed)
  • suppress negative research
  • provide an excuse for ongoing delays in regulation or legislation
  • locate and foster credible public spokespeople with the appearance of independence
  • offer smokers reassurance
  • keep in the public eye 'distraction' or 'diversionary' research (which, for example, places emphasis on air pollution or sick buildings) to deflect attention from tobacco.

Generally, research foundations of this nature have been given official sounding names that betray no connection between the organisation and its financial backers. The organisations have funded in-house research, and acted as funding agencies which provide grants to other groups, with or without obvious tobacco connections.

The first industry research group, established in the USA in 1954, was the Tobacco Industry Research Council (later the Council for Tobacco Research—CTR), which promoted the industry's ends for more than 40 years until its closure under the terms of the Master Settlement Agreement in 1998.262 As an antidote to concerns regarding second-hand smoke, the industry established the Center for Indoor Air Research to fund projects which would support industry resistance to smokefree regulations.173

The Master Settlement Agreement-mandated closure of multi-company cooperative research and lobbying organisations has lead to the sprouting of a new crop of organisations post-Settlement, including the Institute for Science and Health (funded by BAT and Brown & Williamson), the Philip Morris-connected Life Sciences Research Office,264 and the Philip Morris External Research Program (PMERP). A critical analysis of the first round of projects funded by the PMERP shows that foci of the Program's interest were projects which would deliver findings likely to support Philip Morris' corporate aims. An added bonus was using the program as a vehicle for identifying cooperative scientists, as well as gaining credibility and goodwill.262

Other groups have been established to divert attention and trivialise smoking in ways appealing to the popular media. In the early 1990s the Advancement of Sound Science Coalition (TASSC), funded by Philip Morris, purported to be a grassroots coalition of people fed up with health scares and 'junk science.'214 Associates for Research into the Science of Enjoyment (ARISE) claimed to be an affiliation of independent scientists but was actually substantially funded by several tobacco companies. ARISE's brief was to show how 'everyday pleasures, such as eating chocolate, smoking, drinking tea, coffee and alcohol, contribute to the quality of life.'265

10.20.3 Australian-based organisations

The Australian Tobacco Research Foundation (ATRF) opened for business in 1970, the joint creation of the three major tobacco companies operating at the time (WD & HO Wills, Rothmans and Philip Morris), which shared its funding and oversaw its governance. Although criticised from the start for its overt mission of forestalling tobacco regulation and widespread cynicism that it would contribute to robust, impartial research, the ATRF fulfilled a useful PR function for the following two decades, chiefly by providing evidence that the Australian tobacco companies supported independent medical research.261 The ATRF entered terminal decline in 1988, when, in response to building criticism from health interests about the shared interests of and blurred organisational boundaries between the ATRF and the tobacco companies, the entire scientific advisory committee of the ATRF wrote to the Medical Journal of Australia declaring its unanimous agreement that smoking caused disease.266 Negative publicity, compounded by increasing rejection of tobacco research money by the medico-scientific community, lead to the scaling down and eventual closure of the ATRF in 1994.261

Meanwhile the industry was engaged against second-hand smoke (SHS) through the offices of another organisation. In 1987 the Tobacco Institute of Australia (TIA) facilitated the establishment of a local offshoot of the US-based Air Conditioning and Ventilation Associates (ACVA) Atlantic, which came to be known as Healthy Buildings International (HBI).267 HBI's brief was to promote the tobacco industry view that the evidence about SHS was inconclusive; that SHS is a minor issue in the context of overall indoor air quality, and concerns about smoking indoors could be adequately met with appropriate ventilation and by providing smoking areas.[50] HBI gained a high public profile, achieving extensive media coverage and a wide professional audience for its views, while always asserting its status as an independent organisation.267 During the 1990s HBI gained membership on an advisory committee charged with revising Australian Standards for indoor air, a position which allowed it to influence the committee's recommendations, as well as keep Philip Morris abreast of developments, until HBI was exposed and its position on the committee terminated in 2002.267[51]

10.20.4 Tobacco industry funded research in institutions

As discussed in Section 10.20.2 above, the industry has used its own funding bodies, their connection with the industry often obscured, as a conduit for distributing money into mainstream universities and other research institutes.

Over the years, acceptance of tobacco industry funding has been widespread in Australia268 and globally,263 generating rafts of studies with findings beneficial to the tobacco industry. In turn, this research has permeated the peer-reviewed medical press. For example Philip Morris provided the funding for an Israeli study into the determinants of uptake of smoking in young women,269 which examined the influences of genetics, environment and psychological characteristics. Critics have pointed out that the study neglected to include the possible impact of tobacco advertising.270 The successful infiltration by the tobacco industry of reporting of published research in Germany has been credited with serving the industry's interests of increasing the social acceptability of smoking and undermining tobacco control initiatives in that country.271 Prominent researchers at New York's Weill Cornell Medical College caused controversy in 2008 when it became public that they had earlier accepted grants channelled through a tobacco-funded organisation called the Foundation for Lung Cancer: Early Detection, Prevention and Treatment, and that findings from this research272 had been published in mainstream medical press without disclosure of tobacco funding.273

As well as providing funding to individual scientists or departments, in some cases tobacco companies have established entire programs within universities. For example, Philip Morris has funded the Center for Nicotine and Smoking Cessation Research, within Duke University's Nicotine Research Project (in Richmond, Virginia).274 In 2002, in an audacious move which might be funny were it not so cynical, the University of Nottingham accepted funding from BAT to establish the International Centre for Corporate Social Responsibility,[52] invoking, according to one observer, 'the ethics of the cash register'275 (see Section 10.11 for more discussion on the tobacco industry and corporate social responsibility).

To accept or refuse tobacco funding clearly raises important ethical questions. Arguments against accepting tobacco grants include that:174, 263, 276

  • it is unethical that profits earned by the companies manufacturing and marketing tobacco, the cause of many of the conditions against which medical and health workers are fighting, should be used for medical research
  • even in an environment of limited funding for research, scientists must ask whether the value of their research outweighs its utility in furthering the corporate interests of the tobacco industry
  • it lends credibility to industry claims that there is insufficient evidence to conclude that smoking (or second-hand smoke) is a cause of disease, and bolsters the industry furphy that 'more research is needed'
  • it improves the corporate image of the industry to be seen to be involved in apparently altruistic activities and associated with respected scientists and institutions, and can provide leverage in wider policy-setting scenarios
  • those in receipt of tobacco money may feel constrained about what they say publicly about health and smoking; so tobacco funding may therefore silence a potentially influential and articulate opponent
  • accepting money from a source with so clear a vested interest may lead to a biased research program, biased results and biased reporting
  • even the requirement for researchers to divulge the sources of their funding may not expose underlying tobacco finance, which is often well-concealed
  • reliance on funds of tobacco origin leads to 'institutional addiction', in which organisations dependent on tobacco money become unwilling to bite the hand which feeds them.

On the other hand, those who argue in favour of accepting research funding from tobacco companies contend that:263, 277

  • what is at issue is the quality of the work; not the origins of the funding
  • appropriate firewalls and safeguards will ensure that the research is conducted without bias
  • any benefits the tobacco industry might gain in corporate image are minor compared to the potential public health benefits which may accrue from the research
  • the peer review process ensures validity
  • requirements for disclosure alerts the reader to any conflict of interest and makes the findings even more subject to scrutiny
  • funding research is a useful purpose for industry profits.

In June 2004, Cancer Research UK and Universities UK agreed to a protocol which contains guidelines for institutions considering accepting tobacco funding.278 Cancer Research UK is the leading provider of research funding into cancer in the UK, and has a strict policy of avoiding any direct or indirect links with the tobacco industry.279 Cancer Research UK has stated that it will not fund research in a university where there is the possibility that there could be any association with work funded by a tobacco company. The cancer charity also states that it considers it has a duty to publicly criticise a university which accepts tobacco donations. For its part, Universities UK has stated that while it is up to individual universities to decide which funding they should accept, they 'should normally reveal the source of funds for research and should satisfy themselves that their reputation for impartiality, integrity and disinterested inquiry will not be compromised by any particular source of funds.'279 p 6 In the USA, several schools of public health and of medicine (including Harvard University, Emory University, the University of California and Johns Hopkins University) have policies prohibiting acceptance of tobacco funding.280 In Australia, there is no over-arching agreement between universities but many have adopted policies governing or prohibiting the acceptance of tobacco money.281[53]

 

10.20.5 Establishment of international manufacturers' and growers' organisations

For many years the tobacco industry has recognised that it needs to present a unified front against the enemy posed by health organisations. In the late 1970s, at the instigation of Imperial Tobacco in the UK and Philip Morris International, a coalition of tobacco company executives from major companies operating in the UK, the USA and Europe was formed with the shared purpose of defending the tobacco industry against attack and to champion the 'social acceptability' of smoking. To this end, the manufacturers agreed to cooperate in perpetuating the 'controversy' over smoking and health and to maintain that there was no proven causal link between smoking and lung cancer.166 This industry group, which operated under conditions of utmost secrecy, was to become known as the International Committee on Smoking Issues (ICOSI) and in 1981, INFOTAB. Its brief soon extended beyond orchestrating the international smoking and health controversy. INFOTAB acted as a 'hub' for the industry's national manufacturing organisations, tobacco companies and leaf dealers, facilitating the exchange of information and expertise. Up until it ceased operation in 1990-91, INFOTAB provided its membership (including the Australian national manufacturing organisation—the Tobacco Institute of Australia)—with: 282

  • up-to-date information databases
  • media monitoring
  • relevant publications and reports
  • pro-industry scientific findings
  • resources and programs ready to implement
  • reports on tobacco control activities
  • responses to public health activities
  • litigation updates.

In 1992, a new organisation—the Tobacco Documentation Centre (now operating under the name International Tobacco Documentation Centre)—was established and continues to fulfil some of the former roles of INFOTAB, chiefly information sharing.283 A second organisation, Agro-Tobacco Services (ATS), was set up in the same year to coordinate and support the International Tobacco Growers' Association (discussed below). ATS was subsequently replaced by a UK-based public relations firm called Hallmark Marketing Services.283[54]

The International Tobacco Growers' Association (ITGA) was founded in 1984, 'with the objective of presenting the cause of millions of tobacco farmers to the world.'[55] Among its activities, ITGA facilitates contact among its membership, shares non-competitive information, represents its membership to national and international policy-makers, and defends tobacco farmers against national and international anti-tobacco growing campaigns.

Despite its claims of independence from the manufacturing industry, internal industry documents show that ITGA has been used very much as a lobbying front for the international tobacco companies, representing its combined interests and 'managing' tobacco issues in representations to WHO, the Food and Agriculture Organisation and other bodies.10, 227, 283

ITGA's website stoutly defends tobacco farmers against environmentalists' claims that tobacco farming has caused deforestation (see Section 10.14.1).

ITGA also discusses its connection with the Eliminating Child Labour in Tobacco (ECLT) Foundation and its commitment to combating child labour. (see Section 10.15.1).

10.20.6 Australian manufacturers' organisations

10.20.6.1 The Tobacco Institute of Australia Ltd

The now inactive Tobacco Institute of Australia Ltd (TIA) was the main locus for tobacco industry lobbying in Australia from its inception in 1978 until the late 1990s.282[56] Established as a national manufacturers' association in response to growing negative publicity about smoking, the TIA was jointly funded by the tobacco companies operating in Australia at the time with a charter to 'promote understanding of the tobacco industry in Australia'.284 This the TIA did chiefly by representing its member companies to the public, the government and other authorities and through negotiating policy issues on behalf of its constituency. In effect, the TIA's major roles were to lobby against tobacco control measures, to present a united public face of the Australian tobacco industry wherever needed, and to sow seeds of doubt and denial about the health effects of smoking and other matters of 'controversy'.[57] Through its alliance with INFOTAB and other national manufacturers' organisations (particularly the US Tobacco Institute),282 the TIA and its membership were also kept abreast of tobacco issues worldwide.

In her analysis of the workings of the TIA, Carter has divided the TIA's 20 years of activity into four distinct chapters.282 In its first six years, the TIA's work was primarily involved with networking and promoting tobacco industry views on smoking and health, advertising and children, second-hand smoke, and the tobacco industry's financial importance. Its second phase, from 1983 until 1989, was marked by aggressive advocacy mostly under the stewardship of chief executive officer John Dollisson. The TIA's court case (and eventual bruising loss) against the Australian Federation of Consumer Organisations brought this chapter to a close, after which the TIA entered five difficult years of transient leadership, fractured support and apparent demoralisation. In the TIA's final phase, from 1994 to 1997, it was staffed by lawyers and its approach to public affairs became more disciplined and proactive.

In its heyday, the TIA ran high-profile media campaigns to promote its views, the main focus being second-hand smoke. In 1985 the TIA lodged a four page 'advertorial' spread in the Australian Women's Weekly. The advertisement purported to represent the facts about SHS and in layout it appeared to be a feature article typical of the Weekly. The TIA's association with the advertorial appeared in small print at the end of the piece, 'inserted in the interests of fair and open discussion by the Tobacco Institute of Australia Ltd.' The information on SHS provided in the advertisement was at odds with mainstream medical and scientific findings reported at the time. In response to complaints, the TIA's advertisement was deemed by the Advertising Standards Council (ASC) to be misleading in presentation (in that it was inadequately identified as paid advertising material) but no ruling was made on its content, this being outside the ASC's remit.

Two half-page newspaper advertisements were devised and lodged by the TIA in July of the following year, again defending the industry against claims regarding SHS. The advertisements appeared in 14 newspapers across Australia. The advertisements selectively quoted a number of sources, including the World Health Organization and the American Cancer Society, giving the impression that these bodies did not support the view that SHS is harmful to health. Among other things, one of the advertisements declared that 'there is little evidence and nothing which proves scientifically that cigarette smoke causes disease in non-smokers.'285 Again, in response to complaints made to the ASC and the Trade Practices Commission, the TIA was reprimanded. The issue was subsequently taken up by the Australian Federation of Consumer Organisations (AFCO), which brought a case against the TIA in the Federal Court, on the grounds that the newspaper advertising was misleading or deceptive and therefore in contravention of Section 52 of the Trade Practices Act (1974). In a groundbreaking decision handed down by Justice Morling, the AFCO won the case, and the TIA lost an appeal it subsequently brought against the decision. AFCO v TIA resulted in a landmark decision of international significance, in which a link between SHS and disease among non-smokers was accepted by a court of law.[58] And in an outcome which could hardly have been worse for the TIA, the Morling decision gave legal impetus to the surge towards smokefree workplaces.

10.20.6.2 The Tobacco Information Centre Inc

The Sydney-based Tobacco Information Centre was established in December 1996 by Rothmans of Pall Mall (Australia) Ltd, WD & HO Wills (Australia) Ltd and Philip Morris (Australia) Ltd, 'as a library of tobacco and smoking-related information.' 286 According to its publicly stated brief, the TIC's function was to 'provide current, timely and high-quality tobacco-related information to Australia's three tobacco companies,' as well as to government bodies, politicians, industry and trade organisations, special interest groups and members of the public. The TIC categorically denied that it had any role in undertaking political lobbying, public affairs work or media liaison on behalf of its funding members.286

The TIC published a tobacco industry fact newsletter, another newsletter (Peace Pipe) that reported on 'current smoking issues', and a number of fact sheets.286 The TIC no longer appears to be active.

10.20.7 Smokers' rights groups

Smokers' rights groups provide a further conduit for tobacco industry lobbying by claiming to represent the views of the smoker. They are intended to mobilise smokers, offering them reassurance, and providing a vehicle by which they may voice opposition to tobacco control measures.287 Primarily arising in response to moves to restrict smoking in public places, smokers' rights groups also address issues such as tobacco taxes. Smokers' rights groups typically portray their membership as the beset-upon smoker, indulging in a legal behaviour, being unreasonably harassed by over-zealous 'anti's.'

Early Australian examples of smokers' rights groups include the Smokers' Rights League in the late 1970s,287 and FOREST (Freedom Organisation for the Right to Enjoy Smoking Tobacco), which was established in Victoria during the mid-1980s in response to concerns about SHS. Smokers were told that 'by supporting FOREST you can support the interests of all smokers in Australia. You can have your say with State and Federal Governments, transport operators, advertisers, newspapers, radio and television and, through FOREST, you can let them all know you are tired of being pushed around...'288 Fair Go began in NSW in the late 1980s with the brief of countering bans on smoking in NSW trains, before moving on to a broader canvas of smokers' concerns.289 The Tobacco Smokers Freedom Movement Inc emerged in Western Australia in 1993, offering cigarettes at discount prices and stating its intention to lobby on behalf of smokers' rights.290 The extent of the relationship between the tobacco industry and these Australian groups was never clarified, but overseas experience demonstrates that the tobacco industry was directly involved in the establishment of and ongoing practical support for smokers' rights organisations.287

Internationally, smokers' rights groups are deemed to have offered little in the way of lasting assistance to the tobacco industry, never capturing the membership or even the interest of smokers on a significant scale. Only a small number of groups appear to remain active, none of these in Australia.287

10.20.8 Tobacco retailers as a lobby base

Tobacco retailers constitute an obvious and ready-made lobbying base for the industry to use to promote the industry view. Firstly, they have a clear interest in protecting their income stream against potential threat. Secondly, in their front-line position selling tobacco, they are able to provide information and promote industry views within the community. Thirdly, their business profile gives the tobacco industry access to all levels of government.

From the earliest days of the smoking and health 'controversy,' tobacco traders have been armed with the means to pacify nervous smokers. An investigation of trade journals (The Australian Retail Tobacconist and its state-specific predecessors) dating back to 1950 shows that these magazines included articles providing industry guidance on how retailers could reassure their customers. Retailers were also advised how to keep their products attractive to the 'youthful novice' smoker and young women smokers.291 The authors of this research contend that today's tobacco trade journals may continue to perform the role of promoting industry views and providing counter arguments to tobacco control measures.291

Prior to bans on advertising at point of sale, it was usual for tobacco companies to provide retailers with display cabinets, advertising material, support merchandise, and functional fittings such as outdoor awnings, hours of opening signs and so forth. With increased restrictions on advertising in the media, the function of 'point of sale' advertising at retail outlets became ever more critical. The tobacco companies compete for dominance on the shop floor and in display units by offering financial and other incentives to retailers to give prominence to their brands.292 The central importance of the retail outlet as a conduit for communication with customers in the wake of advertising bans is discussed in Chapter 11, Section 11.6.2.

Tobacco retailers have been rallied to support the industry against the encroachment of tobacco control regulation in regard to tobacco advertising, smoking restrictions and tax increases on tobacco products.291 In 2008, Philip Morris canvassed retailers in NSW to solicit their support in opposing bans on tobacco displays at point of sale. As well as providing information (in several languages) about why retailers should feel concerned about further restrictions, Philip Morris urged retailers to express their views to relevant state politicians and offered further information and assistance if needed.293

10.20.9 Marshalling opposition to smoking bans in entertainment and social venues

The tobacco industry has vigorously opposed restrictions on smoking because it limits opportunities to smoke, so reducing consumption, and further denormalises smoking behaviour, so discouraging uptake and influencing smokers to quit.294-297 The introduction of smoking restrictions in most Australian workplaces during the 1980s and 1990s was a major blow for the tobacco industry. In recent years, attention has moved to thwarting smoking restrictions in entertainment venues such as bars, restaurants, nightclubs and other licensed venues, and gambling environments. The tobacco industry has made strong allies of the hospitality industry in Australia169, 298 and internationally299, 300 chiefly through fostering fear that smoking bans will adversely affect their profitability if not their survival (an industry argument which is not supported by the evidence300).

During the 1990s a former chief executive officer of the Tobacco Institute of Australia (TIA) became the national executive director of the Australian Hotels Association (AHA), and since that time the AHA has actively supported the tobacco industry in opposing smoking restrictions and bans and challenging the scientific evidence on second-hand smoke.169 The Australian Hotels Association website[59] provides a range of resources for its members, including materials designed for distribution to government. Key points made by the AHA include arguments claiming that smoking bans:

  • cause the mass closure of licensed premises leading to economic downturn and job losses
  • do not reduce prevalence of smoking
  • lead to increased smoking at home around children, and the risk of house fires
  • contribute to increased domestic violence
  • cause community nuisances including more cigarette butt litter, neighbourhood noise and footpath congestion
  • increase the risk of drink spiking (if people leave their drink unattended to go outside to smoke)
  • make more work for door security staff (managing traffic in and out of the venue)
  • will reduce government revenues as well as increase problem gambling
  • trample on civil liberties
  • offer no health benefit.

In preparation for strict smoking restrictions introduced in Victoria in 2007, all three tobacco companies operating in Australia struck financial deals with several individual Melbourne hoteliers to assist with development of open-air facilities where smoking could be permitted, in exchange for the exclusive right to sell their own brands.301

[50]The tobacco industry's response to SHS is discussed further in Chapter 3, Section 3.25.

[51] However HBI remains a commercial entity and on its website it continues to downplay the contribution of SHS to indoor pollution. See: http://www.hbi.com.au/smokepol.html

[52] See: http://www.nottingham.ac.uk/business/ICCSR/about/FoundationofTheICCSR.html

[53] This article by Chapman includes further information regarding the policies of Australian universities in this article supplement weblink: http://jech.bmj.com/cgi/data/58/5/361/DC1/3

[54] McDaniel et al provide a detailed account of the activities of ICOSI, INFOTAB, ATS and Hallmark Services.283

[55] See: www.tobaccoleaf.org

[56] For a detailed account of the activities of the TIA over its 20 year lifespan, refer to Carter.282

[57] To read, view and hear a collation of public statements made by tobacco industry executives and officers from the TIA dismissing the impact of smoking on health, visit http://tobacco.health.usyd.edu.au/site/supersite/resources/docs/gallery_leaders.htm and http://tobacco.health.usyd.edu.au/site/supersite/resources/docs/diary_of_denial.htm

[58] For a full account of this court case a well as transcripts of the judgement, see Everingham and Woodward.285

[59] See http://www.aha.org.au/resources.html

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