10.19 Tobacco industry lobbying: the targets

10.19.1 Major scientific reviews

The findings published in authoritative scientific reviews about smoking and health, the publicity they generate and the impetus they give to governments to introduce tobacco control policies inflict huge damage to the tobacco industry. Consequently the industry engages vigorously with scientific process using many of the tools described in the preceding sections, such as countering mainstream science with its own research and employing third parties to argue on its behalf. One of the earliest examples of the industry interfering with the content of an essential scientific review is when it successfully influenced the definition of addiction that led to the classification of tobacco as an 'habituation' in the 1964 US Surgeon General's Advisory Committee report. Tobacco was later clearly defined as addictive in the 1988 US Surgeon General's report.1

In the 1990s, the industry directly engaged in several attempts to disrupt the scientific review process. For example, in Australia, the industry mounted a concerted effort to undermine and derail the National Health and Medical Research Council's review on passive smoking, which was finally published in 1997.2 The Tobacco Institute of Australia launched legal challenges regarding the procedure of the review, attempted to discredit individuals on the council's working party, and commissioned several consultants to make submissions to the working party expressing pro-industry views. The industry also primed allies to speak to the media in its support. The Tobacco Institute of Australia had a fair measure of success, in that publication of the recommendations of the final report was prevented on purely procedural grounds. (There was no problem with the science or the recommendations themselves. Nonetheless this provided enough ammunition for the industry to dismiss the report and its findings widely in the media.)2

In the US, the tobacco industry launched a similar offensive3 against California's Environmental Protection Agency, which issued a report on environmental tobacco smoke in 1997.4 The industry exerted pressure on the Environmental Protection Agency and related instrumentalities, attacked procedural issues and directly lobbied politicians. The industry also courted the news media in an effort to promote its views; Philip Morris went so far as to provide financial support for the National Journalism Centre (a school of journalism).5 As in Australia, the tobacco industry was successful in delaying the process and eventual release of the report, and took every opportunity along the way to gain positive publicity by discrediting the report and the procedures followed in its development.5 The International Agency for Research on Cancer was also targeted by Philip Morris with strategies intended to undermine its work on secondhand smoke by disputing the research, influencing media coverage and countering government attempts to introduce smoking restrictions.6

The industry also tried to prevent agencies outside of the health sector from publishing damaging tobacco control reports. In 1999 the World Bank published a landmark report on the economics of tobacco control, Curbing the Epidemic: Governments and the Economics of Tobacco Control,7 which concluded that tobacco control brings unprecedented health benefits without harming economies. This threatened the tobacco companies' ability to use economic arguments to dissuade governments from enacting tobacco control policies and supporting the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (WHO FCTC), the first international treaty to be negotiated under the auspices of the World Health Organization. The industry hired public relations firms, had academics critique the Curbing the Epidemic report, hired consultants to produce estimates of the importance of tobacco to the economy, and worked through front groups, particularly the International Tobacco Growers' Association, to question the report's findings. These efforts were a near total failure, and the report remains an authoritative economic analysis of global tobacco control.8

10.19.2 Countering tobacco control legislation

Exerting effective influence on government decision making in Australia, and elsewhere, is an ongoing concern for the tobacco industry. Once legislation is in place, it is difficult to overturn. If shown to be effective in one part of the world, tobacco control legislation is often replicated in other jurisdictions. It is a general rule of thumb in tobacco control advocacy that the more effective a particular initiative is going to be, the more aggressively the industry will oppose it—often referred to as the 'industry scream test'.9 Regulation that gains industry support is not likely to be any serious threat to the industry.

The history of industry opposition and lobbying in regard to legislation initiatives in Australia has been well documented. The earliest battlefields related to the introduction of restrictions on advertising10-12 and later, health warnings on tobacco packages.13 Regulatory initiatives to introduce restrictions on smoking14 and increase tobacco taxation15 have also provoked vigorous response. This strategic opposition continues, as evidenced by the well-funded tobacco industry campaign against plain packaging reforms.16,17

Since the 1990s, in light of the industry's corporate social responsibility agenda, the tobacco companies, to varying degrees, espouse appropriate regulation of their products. For example, the Philip Morris International website states, 'to be effective, tobacco regulatory policy must be evidence-based. Regulations must be applied to all tobacco products and all tobacco manufacturers, and should take into account the views of all legitimate stakeholders including public health authorities, government finance authorities, tobacco manufacturers and other members of the legitimate tobacco supply chain, tobacco farmers, and consumers'.18

The adoption of the WHO FCTC Article 5.3 guidelines is designed to help governments protect tobacco legislation from tobacco industry interference.19,20 Implementation of the 5.3 guidelines at a national level is already proving a challenge for key international philanthropic organisations that fund tobacco control and other health projects due to organisation executive ties to the tobacco industry.21-23

Table 10.17.1 in Section 10.17 lists the industry tactics used most often to counter tobacco control regulation. Subsections 10.19.2.1–10.19.2.2 describe brief case studies as examples of how the industry has lobbied against regulation.

10.19.2.1 Case study: pre-emptive self-regulation

Arguing for self-regulation is a tried and true industry tactic. It provides the industry with a means of avoiding strong and effective governmental regulation by taking the initiative to introduce its own voluntary code of conduct. The industry reaps the dual benefits of appearing responsive to government and public concerns, while simultaneously ensuring that any such voluntary code is harmless to industry interests. In contrast, legislation carries penalties for non-compliance, is difficult to rescind, and closes the door on further negotiation.

Philip Morris introduced its own system of placing ineffective health warnings on its packaging for use in countries (particularly the developing world) where regulation was weak or not in place. Internal documents show that Philip Morris deliberately gave the appearance of responding to public health concerns (while doing so very much on its own terms) and simultaneously earned positive publicity for its responsible stance.24

Until superseded by state and federal legislation, tobacco advertising in Australia was in large part subject to a series of voluntary agreements struck between the tobacco companies and the federal government. The elasticity of the voluntary agreements and the many and varied ways in which they were flouted by the tobacco companies have been well documented.25, 26 (See Chapter 11 for further discussion.)

10.19.2.2 Case study: undermining the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control

The WHO FCTC initiated in 1999 by the WHO and signed by 174 countries (as of August 2011), represents an orchestrated threat to the industry on a global scale. It is therefore not surprising that the industry attempted to thwart the development and subsequent ratification of the FCTC.27

Between 1999 and 2001, British American Tobacco, Philip Morris and Japan Tobacco International worked together on 'Project Cerberus', an initiative intended to devise an alternative voluntary code for advertising and other industry conduct, which it hoped governments could be persuaded to accept instead of signing up to the WHO FCTC.28

Companies also conducted their own offensives against the WHO FCTC. For example, Philip Morris employed a public policy and issues management firm (Mongoven, Biscoe and Duchin) in 1997 to advise on the process for formulating and ratifying the WHO FCTC and how this might be subverted. Carter's analysis of industry documents shows that Mongoven, Biscoe and Duchin gained high level access to the process within the WHO. Among its recommendations, Mongoven, Biscoe and Duchin advised Philip Morris to delay the process; to attempt to steer the convention towards a focus on children (thereby leaving the rest of the market open for 'adult choice'); and to seek allies among non-government organisations. It was deemed especially important to influence the content of the convention, and to engage with individual member states with a view to nurturing wider regional support.27

The tobacco industry was unsuccessful in its attempts to prevent WHO FCTC ratification and subsequently attempted to influence WHO FCTC guidelines and to block local and national implementation of the WHO FCTC.29 There is strong evidence that the industry engaged in lobbying on a regional basis, attempting to influence governments to comply with the least stringent options stipulated in the WHO FCTC.30-33

10.19.3 Subverting public health initiatives and tobacco control organisations

It is not surprising that the tobacco industry should keep a watching brief on the activities of public health organisations that promote views inimical to their own. Cooperative efforts within the industry to keep abreast of developments in tobacco control go back at least as far as the World Conference on Smoking and Health in the late 1970s.34

One of the most detailed accounts of how the tobacco industry has responded to tobacco control initiatives is contained in the 260 page report published by the WHO in 2000.35 This report examined internal tobacco industry documents that were made public as a result of the Master Settlement Agreement of 1998 with a view to determining how the industry had sought to counter the objectives of the WHO. The documents revealed that multiple strategies had been used, including:

  • establishing connections with WHO employees, consultants and advisors, and infiltrating the organisation with its own consultants in order to influence policy issues
  • attempting to shift financial priority away from tobacco control activities
  • engaging with other UN agencies (such as the Food and Agriculture Organization and the World Bank) to undermine WHO policy
  • using 'independent' individuals and organisations to discredit the WHO's policies and officers
  • using apparently unrelated organisations to lobby on its behalf against WHO policies
  • discrediting or distorting WHO research
  • monitoring, at times secretly, WHO meetings and other activities.

The industry was especially keen to place a wedge between developing and developed countries by characterising the WHO as an organisation with 'first world' priorities, unfairly endangering the economic opportunities provided by tobacco industry in developing countries. The report concludes:

'At the most fundamental level, this inquiry confirms that tobacco use is unlike other threats to global health. Infectious diseases do not employ multinational public relations firms. There are no front groups to promote the spread of cholera. Mosquitoes have no lobbyists. The evidence presented here suggests that tobacco is a case unto itself, and that reversing its burden on global health will be not only about understanding addiction and curing disease, but, just as importantly, about overcoming a determined and powerful industry.' (p 244)35

In the US during the 1990s, the tobacco industry countered major National Cancer Institute initiatives promoting community-based tobacco cessation projects. The program, American Stop Smoking Intervention Study (ASSIST), was the largest and most comprehensive tobacco control program launched in the US, and was strongly oriented to interventions and activities at a local level.36 The tobacco industry response was thorough. The industry monitored the projects; attempted to infiltrate them, obstructing them in some communities; and seeded negative media stories. A network of allies to assist in lobbying was organised. The industry attempted to have pre-emptive legislation introduced to protect tobacco advertising. The industry also attacked the basis of the project as a misuse of taxpayers' money to unfairly target the tobacco industry and launched a number of law suits, which disrupted and delayed program implementation.36, 37 Litigation has also been used by the industry as a tool against other tobacco control campaigns in the media, such as those run by the American Legacy Foundation and the California Tobacco Education Media Campaign.38

As well as targeting interventions, the industry paid attention to the organisations that worked against its interests. Evidence from internal tobacco industry documents in the US shows that tobacco companies attempted to infiltrate at least two organisations. STAT (Stop Teenage Addiction to Tobacco) and INFACT (the Infant Formula Action Coalition) were active and effective during the 1990s and pursued agendas antithetical to industry interests.39 In their efforts to gain intelligence on the activities of these groups, the tobacco industry used intermediaries to access materials on their behalf and to attend conferences, planted public relations consultants as spies to attend and report on meetings, and illegally tape recorded meetings.39 The industry has also made it its business to publicly discredit key individuals working in tobacco control.27, 40

The evidence of tobacco industry infiltration of health interests in Australia is sparse but it is probable that it has been attempted. According to a former CEO of the Tobacco Institute of Australia (as stated during court testimony in 2005), in the early 1990s the Tobacco Institute of Australia engaged a private investigations agency to arrange for rubbish bins belonging to certain health organisations, such as the NSW Cancer Council and the National Heart Foundation, to be searched in an effort to discover the health lobby's forward planning and funding details.41

Philip Morris USA took a different tack in 1995, undermining public health initiatives by appearing to offer them its support.40 As part of 'Project Sunrise', Philip Morris identified and then actively sought dialogue with public health advocates that it deemed to be 'moderate' in view and likely to be persuaded to see advantages in forming cooperative policies on tobacco control (such as concentrating on harm reduction strategies rather than on policies that would impact more negatively on industry profitability and survival). The benefits of any alliances would be multiple: they would buy Philip Morris social credibility; they could act as a conduit for Philip Morris's views in arena in which Philip Morris would normally be excluded; and they might help ensure that any programs supported or regulation developed was acceptable to Philip Morris. But above all, Philip Morris could argue that people who did not wish to associate with them were 'prohibitionists' or 'extremists', establishing useful schisms between tobacco control advocates and diluting their effectiveness.40

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