10.21 Tobacco industry lobbying—the targets
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10.21.1 Major scientific reviews
The findings published in authoritative scientific reviews about smoking and health, the publicity they generate and the impetus they give to governments to introduce tobacco control policies inflict huge damage to the tobacco industry. Consequently the industry engages vigorously with scientific process using many of the tools described in the preceding sections, such as countering mainstream science with its own research and employing apparently independent third parties to argue on their behalf.
The industry has also directly engaged in attempting to disrupt the review process. For example, in Australia, the industry mounted a concerted effort to undermine and derail the National Health and Medical Research Council's scientific review on passive smoking, finally published in 1997.169 The Tobacco Institute of Australia (TIA) launched legal challenges regarding the procedure of the review, attempted to discredit individuals on the Council's Working Party, and commissioned several consultants to make submissions to the Working Party expressing pro-industry views. The industry also primed allies to speak to the media in its support. The TIA had a fair measure of success, in that publication of the recommendations of the final report was prevented on procedural grounds (but not because the actual science of the report, or the content of the recommendations, was in question). Nonetheless this provided enough ammunition for the industry to dismiss the report and its findings widely in the media.169
In the USA, the tobacco industry launched a similar offensive170 against California's Environment Protection Authority which issued a report on Environmental Tobacco smoke in 1997.302 The industry exerted pressure on the EPA and related instrumentalities, attacked procedural issues, and directly lobbied politicians. The industry also courted the news media in an effort to promote its views; Philip Morris went so far as to provide financial support for the National Journalism Centre (a school of journalism).303 As in Australia, the tobacco industry was successful in delaying the process and eventual release of the report, and took every opportunity along the way to gain positive publicity by discrediting the report and the procedures followed in its development.170 The International Agency for Research on Cancer was also targeted by Philip Morris with strategies intended to undermine its work on SHS by disputing the research, influencing media coverage and countering government attempts to introduce smoking restrictions.171
10.21.2 Countering tobacco control legislation
Influencing the direction of government decision making in Australia and elsewhere is an abiding concern for the tobacco industry and in the light of the health evidence against its products, necessary for its survival. Once legislation is in place, it is difficult to overturn. If shown to be effective in one part of the world, tobacco control legislation is often replicated in other jurisdictions.
It is a general rule of thumb in tobacco control advocacy that the more effective a particular initiative is going to be, the more aggressively the industry will oppose it. Regulation which gains industry support is not likely to be any serious threat to the industry.
The extent of industry influence is not to be underestimated, especially in regions where tobacco is grown and government and industry share economic concerns. Speaking of its lobbying activities in Kenya, for example, BAT has boasted that 'the law was actually drafted by us but the Government is to be congratulated on its wise actions.'304
The history of industry opposition and lobbying in regard to legislation initiatives in Australia has been well-documented. The earliest battlefields related to the introduction of restrictions on advertising305-307 and later, health warnings on tobacco packages.308 Regulatory initiatives to introduce of restrictions on smoking298 and increase tobacco taxation309 have also provoked vigorous response.
Since the 1990s and the industry's new regard for corporate social responsibility, the tobacco companies, to varying degrees, espouse 'appropriate' regulation of their products. For example, the PMI website5 assures its visitors that 'We're working with governments and the public health community to help create strong and effective tobacco regulation,' an assertion which doubtless astonishes the public health community worldwide in the light of Philip Morris's activities to ensure that precisely the opposite occurs.
Table 10.21 in Section 10.19 lists the industry tactics used most often to counter tobacco control regulation.253[60]
10.21.2.1 Case study: pre-emptive self regulation
Arguing for self regulation is a tried and true industry tactic. It provides the industry with a means of avoiding strong and effective governmental regulation by taking the initiative to introduce its own voluntary code of conduct. The industry reaps the dual benefits of appearing responsive to government and public concerns, while simultaneously ensuring that any such voluntary code is harmless to industry interests. In contrast, legislation carries penalties for non-compliance, is difficult to rescind, and closes the door on further negotiation.
Philip Morris has introduced its own system of placing ineffective health warnings on its packaging for use in countries (particularly the developing world) where regulation was weak or not in place. Internal documents show that Philip Morris deliberately gave the appearance of responding to public health concerns (while doing so very much on its own terms) and simultaneously earned positive publicity for its responsible stance.310
Until superseded by state and federal legislation, tobacco advertising in Australia was in large part subject to a series of voluntary agreements struck between the tobacco companies and the federal government. The elasticity of the voluntary agreements and the many and varied ways in which they were flouted by the tobacco companies have been well documented175, 311 (see Chapter 11 for further discussion).
10.21.2.2 Case study: opposing the introduction of reduced fire risk cigarettes
During the 1980s and 1990s the US tobacco industry countered demands for the introduction of RFR technology (despite having the ability to do so) by arguing that it was technically impractical, that no testing system could be failsafe, and that people, not cigarettes, caused fires. The industry also complained that the enforcement of RFR regulations would result in higher cigarette prices, increase cigarette toxicity, meet consumer resistance, and lead to reduced sales and fewer brands on the market.106, 109, 110[61] However it is probable that the real reason that the tobacco industry did not wish to adopt RFR technology was out of fear of product liability:108, 109 that victims (or insurance companies) would be able to make claims for damages from fires started by cigarettes. Added to this, the industry would incur expenses in adapting its processing,109 and the corporate philosophy within the tobacco industry is described as being resistant to change if it can be avoided.108
In lobbying against RFR the industry courted the support of firefighting organisations; groups which one might assume on first principles likely to be in favour of RFR cigarettes. The industry achieved this by funding education campaigns and encouraging volunteerism, supporting the introduction and maintenance of smoke alarms, by supporting improved firefighting recruitment and training, and lobbying for the introduction of regulations for fire retardant furniture. During the 1980s the tobacco industry successfully withstood the pressure for RFT cigarettes, with the assistance of its new found allies.109, 313 Continued dedication to seeing the introduction of legislation by a single congressman (John Joseph Moakley) and later his supporters ultimately gained the support of firefighters, probably crucial to the final success313 of the legislation now in place in many states of the USA and nationally in Canada.104
10.21.2.3 Case study: undermining the Framework Convention on Tobacco Control
The Framework Convention on Tobacco Control (FCTC) initiated in 1999 by the World Health Organization and signed by 168 countries (as of September 2008), represents an orchestrated threat to the industry on a global scale. It is therefore not surprising that the industry has attempted to thwart the development and subsequent ratification of the FCTC.314
Between 1999 and 2001, British American Tobacco, Philip Morris and Japan Tobacco International worked together on 'Project Cerberus', an initiative intended to devise an alternative voluntary code for advertising and other industry conduct, which it hoped governments could be persuaded to accept instead of signing up to the FCTC.315
Companies have also conducted their own offensives against the FCTC. For example Philip Morris employed a public policy and issues management firm (Mongoven, Biscoe and Duchin) in 1997 to advise on the processes for formulating and ratifying the FCTC and how these might be subverted. Carter's analysis of industry documents shows that MBD gained high level access to the process within WHO. Among its recommendations, MBD advised PM to delay the process; to attempt to steer the convention towards a focus on children (thereby leaving the rest of the market open for 'adult choice') and to seek allies among non-government organisations. It was deemed especially important to influence content of the convention, and to engage with individual member states with a view to nurturing wider regional support.314 Carter observes that there is no reason to believe that MBD is not still working on PM's behalf against the FCTC.314
There is strong evidence that the industry has engaged in lobbying on a regional basis, attempting to influence governments to comply with the least stringent options stipulated in the FCTC.316-319 The FCTC is discussed in detail in Chapter 17.
10.21.3 Subverting public health initiatives and tobacco control organisations
It is not surprising that the tobacco industry should keep a watching brief on the activities of public health organisations which promote views inimical to their own. Cooperative efforts within the industry to keep abreast of developments in tobacco control go back at least as far as the World Conference on Smoking and Health in the late 1970s.166
Probably the most detailed account of how the tobacco industry has responded to tobacco control initiatives is contained in the 260 page report published by the World Health Organization (WHO) in 2000.320 This report examined the internal tobacco industry documents which were made public as a result of the Master Settlement Agreement of 1998 with a view to determining how the industry had sought to counter the objectives of WHO. The documents revealed that multiple strategies had been used, including:
- establishing connections with WHO employees, consultants and advisors, and infiltrating the organisation with its own consultants in order to influence policy issues
- attempting to shift financial priority away from tobacco control activities
- engaging with other UN agencies (such as the Food and Agricultural Organisation and the World Bank) to undermine WHO policy
- using 'independent' individuals and organisations to discredit WHO's policies and officers
- using apparently unrelated organisations to lobby on its behalf against WHO policies
- discrediting or distorting WHO research
- monitoring, at times secretly, WHO meetings and other activities.
The industry was especially keen to place a wedge between developing and developed countries by characterising WHO as an organisation with 'first world' priorities, unfairly endangering the economic opportunities provided by tobacco industry in developing countries. The report concludes:
'At the most fundamental level, this inquiry confirms that tobacco use is unlike other threats to global health. Infectious diseases do not employ multinational public relations firms. There are no front groups to promote the spread of cholera. Mosquitoes have no lobbyists. The evidence presented here suggests that tobacco is a case unto itself, and that reversing its burden on global health will be not only about understanding addiction and curing disease, but, just as importantly, about overcoming a determined and powerful industry.'320 p 244
In the USA during the 1990s, the tobacco industry countered major National Cancer Institute initiatives promoting community-based tobacco cessation projects. The program, American Stop Smoking Intervention Study (ASSIST) was the largest and most comprehensive tobacco control program launched in the USA, and was strongly oriented to interventions and activities at a local level.321 The tobacco industry response was thorough. The industry monitored the projects, attempted to infiltrate them, obstructed them in some communities, and seeded negative media stories. A network of allies to assist in lobbying was organised. The industry attempted to have pre-emptive legislation introduced to protect tobacco advertising. The industry also attacked the basis of the project as a misuse of taxpayers' money to unfairly target the tobacco industry and launched a number of lawsuits which disrupted and delayed program implementation.321, 322 Litigation has also been used by the industry as a weapon against other tobacco control campaigns in the media, such as those run by the American Legacy Foundation and the California Tobacco Education Media Campaign.323
As well as targeting interventions, the industry pays attention to the organisations which work against its interests. Evidence from internal tobacco industry documents in the USA shows that tobacco companies attempted to infiltrate at least two organisations. STAT (Stop Teenage Addiction to Tobacco) and INFACT (formerly the Infant Formula Action Coalition) were active and effective during the 1990s and pursued agendas antithetical to industry interests.324 In their efforts to gain intelligence on the activities of these groups, the tobacco industry used intermediaries to access materials on their behalf and to attend conferences, planted public relations consultants as spies to attend and report on meetings, and illegally tape recorded meetings.324 The industry has also made it its business to publicly discredit key individuals working in tobacco control.156, 314 The evidence for tobacco industry infiltration of health interests in Australia is sparse but it is probable that it has been attempted. According to a former CEO of the Tobacco Institute of Australia, at one stage the TIA engaged a private investigations agency to arrange for rubbish bins belonging to certain health organisations, such as the NSW Cancer Council and the National Heart Foundation, to be searched in an effort to discover the health lobby's forward planning and funding details.325
Philip Morris USA took a different tack in 1995, undermining public health initiatives by appearing to offer them its support.156 As part of 'Project Sunrise,' Philip Morris identified and then actively sought dialogue with public health advocates which it deemed to be 'moderate' in view and likely to be persuaded to see advantages in forming cooperative policies on tobacco control (such as concentrating on harm reduction strategies rather than on policies which would impact more negatively on industry profitability and survival). The benefits of any alliances would be multiple: they would buy PM social credibility; they could act as a conduit for PM's views in arena in which PM would normally be excluded; and they might help ensure that any programs supported or regulations developed were acceptable to PM. But above all, PM could argue that people who did not wish to associate with them were 'prohibitionists' or 'extremists,' establishing useful schisms between tobacco control advocates and diluting their effectiveness.156
[60] Subsections 10.21.2.1–10.21.2.3 briefly describe some of the ways in which the industry has put its strategies into action.
[61] Research undertaken in New York State since the introduction of RFR regulations has shown that none of negative outcomes predicted by the tobacco industry subsequently occurred.110, 312
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