For decades, the tobacco industry has publicly stated that it does not wish young people to start smoking. The health establishment has long regarded these claims with scepticism, pointing out that smoking is the cause of death for two-thirds of its long-term customers1 and that it needs to find a steady stream of new recruits if it wishes to stay in business. Despite industry protestations to the contrary, there is ample evidence that its promotional activities in Australia2 and internationally3 have in the past targeted, and continue to target, new users (see also Chapter 11). While uptake of smoking tends to occur later in adolescence now than it did 20 years ago,4 experimentation with smoking overwhelmingly occurs during the teenage years.5,6 Initiatives adopted by the tobacco industry with the stated intention of reducing the appeal of its products to young people historically have been designed to forestall government intervention and to give the impression that the industry is cooperative and responsible. In the words of a British American Tobacco official in 1973, describing a voluntary agreement for the industry in Hong Kong to withdraw tobacco advertising during children’s television viewing hours: ‘…this is one of the proposals that we shall initiate to show that we as an industry are doing something about discouraging young people to smoke. This of course is a phony way of showing sincerity as we all well know’.7 i
As part of the industry’s purported embrace of corporate responsibility, it developed smoking prevention programs for young people worldwide. These typically took the form of programs aimed at retailers, advertising aimed at young people and their parents, and sponsorship of ‘life skills’ educational programs.8 These activities have been widely criticised by tobacco control experts for their demonstrated ineffectiveness, their intention to downplay health risks and manufacture doubt and uncertainty,9 as well as the benefits they may bring the tobacco industry, including:8,10,11
- shifting responsibility for prevention from the industry and placing the onus on retailers, parents and social groups
- fostering partnerships with government and non-government health and education interests, which may give the industry political clout as well as credibility
- strengthening communications with retailers and shoring up support for future lobbying activities
- making opponents look like extremists
- giving the industry an opportunity to communicate directly with young people
- reinforcing smoking as an ‘adult choice’ (hence enhancing its cachet among teenagers)
- providing ‘proof’ if required in a legal setting that the industry has taken action to discourage smoking among young people.
10.13.1 Underage access prevention programs
Access programs address how young people purchase tobacco, and generally focus on the retail environment. In Australia it is illegal in every state and territory to sell tobacco products to anyone aged younger than 18. Laws regarding sales to minors have been in place since the turn of last century in Australia—see Australian Tobacco Control Timeline. They have long been a component of a comprehensive tobacco control program and their role in Australian tobacco control policy remains important as a deterrent to under-age sales.12 See Section 5.11 for more on accessibility of tobacco products to young smokers.
There is debate over how effective access laws are in reducing smoking prevalence in young people, since it is well known that younger people who smoke obtain their cigarettes from a variety of other sources, particularly friends and family.13 Strictly policed laws might indeed reduce sales to minors, but do not stop young people from getting cigarettes via their social networks.14 It is also clear, however, that regular, long-term enforcement of age related access laws can help prevent underage young people from smoking.15 To maximise effectiveness, a comprehensive retailer enforcement and compliance program is necessary, including monitoring, use of underage undercover shoppers, and reporting of violations paired with significant penalties. Training retailers to recognise fake identification may also help improve compliance (See Section 5.21).16
Investigation of tobacco industry documents in Australia and overseas has shown that the industry co-opted age related access issues as a low-risk opportunity for gaining important public relations benefits.2,8,17 Since the early 1980s, the Australian tobacco industry actively supported access programs by providing information and signage to tobacco retailers.2 In the early 2000s three Australian companies co-sponsored a program called ‘18+—it’s the law’—which provided in-store materials and advice to retailers. For the launch of the 2002 version of the program, the tobacco industry advertised in both the trade and mainstream press. In an environment in which communication by the tobacco industry is greatly curtailed, this advertising provided a rare opportunity for the industry to portray itself as a socially responsible corporate citizen. As of 2025, an ‘18+—it’s the law’ symbol can still be seen on BATA’s website on the ‘Underage Access Prevention’ page.18 Sponsoring access programs also assisted the tobacco industry to build close relationships with tobacco retailers — particularly those in the convenience retail sector. In turn, these same retailers can then serve as a more 'credible' public face for the tobacco industry. For example, in Canada, tobacco companies support the We Expect ID access program and are also members of several retailer bodies, including the Canadian Convenience Stores Association [CCSA].ii The CCSA is a vocal opponent of effective tobacco control measures, such as plain packaging, and supportive of industry friendly policies, such as making possession of tobacco products among young people illegal and punishable by large fines.19
In the mid-2010s, all tobacco companies, except Altria, were still mentioning on their company websites financial support for the creation and maintenance of retailer-based proof-of-age programs under their CSR pages including; We Card (US), We Expect ID (Canada), and Citizen Card (UK).20 In 2019, Altria Group Distribution Company (AGDC) implemented the retailer incentive program We Card.21 In 2023, Philip Morris International announced that it had also implemented We Card, with the companies Swedish Match affiliate serving on the We Card’s manufacturer advisory council.22 Japan Tobacco International UK, on its website, states its commitment to youth access prevention by supporting the No ID, No Sale! campaign.23 BAT briefly mentions underage access prevention programs on its website under ‘Working with retailers’.24
10.13.2 ‘Life skills’ programs
Another component of the industry’s activities in smoking prevention among young people was sponsorship of life skills education programs. These programs typically touched on licit and illicit drug use, and include themes such as personal responsibility, self-determination, self-esteem, peer influences and media influences. There is strong evidence that in the US, the tobacco industry has actively supported programs known to be ineffective and that in doing so it has managed to keep at bay the introduction of other, more hard-hitting life skills programs such as programs that expose industry tactics, deal graphically with health effects and denormalise smoking—see Chapter 5.25 Analysis of industry-supported programs has found them to be fundamentally deficient from a public health perspective.26 These programs have also provided the tobacco industry with leverage against the introduction of stronger tobacco control measures intended to protect young people.25,27
Efforts by the Australian tobacco industry to distribute material in schools failed during the 1980s.28,29 In the late 1990s Philip Morris funded the development of a program for Australian teachers to help schoolchildren ‘say no’ to smoking, illicit drugs, drinking and bullying. Philip Morris wished to conceal its association with the program, ‘I’ve got the power’, due to fears that if the connection were exposed, the program would be met with hostility.2 Its fears proved well founded and the program did not gain acceptance in Australia.30 However, despite criticism, Philip Morris provided funding for educational materials about substance abuse intended for young Aboriginal peoples, in collaboration with the NSW Aboriginal Education Consultative Group and the Victorian Aboriginal Education Association Incorporated.31
The tobacco industry is also not forthcoming about its support of education initiatives, with Philip Morris International stating only that it provides funding to teachers and community organisations to support educational efforts in areas ‘where we feel such help is needed.’ A spokesperson from Altria said ‘We know that our direct engagement in the implementation of programs is not the right approach, so we invest in proven effective, evidence-based programs like LifeSkills Training program’.32 Other tobacco industry smoking prevention educational programs include ‘Right Decisions Right Now’ a program for US middles schoolers, and Altria’s ‘Success 360°’, a partnership with a variety of organisations that focuses on young people.20 In 2020, companies under the ownership of Altria provided roughly US$25 million in funding for programs aimed at young people.32
The World Health Organization has recommended against the use of tobacco industry-endorsed smoking prevention programs for young people, in recognition that they are intended to serve industry purposes rather than reduce the uptake of smoking.27
10.13.3 Anti-smoking advertising
In the US and other countries tobacco companies launched extensive television and magazine advertising campaigns with the stated intention of discouraging smoking among young people.8 These programs proliferated in the early 2000s, with Philip Morris taking its offensive to more than 70 countries in 2001.8 In the US, the volume of tobacco-sponsored anti-smoking advertising once equalled or exceeded that of health interests.33,34
In 1998, Philip Morris commenced the ‘Think. Don’t Smoke’ campaign in the US. This was soon followed by another campaign by US-based company, Lorillard, with the slogan ‘Tobacco is whacko if you’re a teen’.34 The common message of these advertisements was that smoking is an adult choice and that young people don’t need to smoke to fit in socially. The Philip Morris advertisements did not explain exactly why young people should not smoke, and instead repeated the theme that you do not have to smoke to ‘be cool’.34,35 Philip Morris also produced advertisements aimed at parents (‘Talk. They’ll Listen’).
Several studies from the US show that industry-funded programs have not been effective34-38 and may even have fostered a more positive attitude towards the tobacco companies.34,38 A large study conducted over a four-year period found that tobacco industry campaigns neither reduced smoking nor intention to smoke among the target audience, and that advertisements advising parents to talk to their children about smoking might have influenced teenagers in their senior high school years to smoke.36 The tobacco companies do not support campaigns that could affect profitability or undermine industry operations.8,25
10.13.4 Promoting a ‘smoke-free’ future
In 2016, Philip Morris International (PMI) announced its intention to transform itself and has since claimed to be building a ‘smoke-free future’, ‘unsmoking’ the world, and helping people who currently smoke to ‘unsmoke’.39 Similarly, British American Tobacco (BAT) states its purpose is ‘To build A Better Tomorrow’ by reducing the health impact of its business and that people who smoke and cannot quit should be encouraged to switch to ‘reduced risk alternatives’.39 Imperial Brands claims it is developing a sustainable ‘Next Generation Product’ business and making a ‘meaningful contribution to harm reduction’ as part of its ‘environmental, social and governance’ responsibilities.39 Lastly, Altria claims its 10-year vision is to ‘Responsibly lead the transition of adult smokers to a non-combustible future’.39
Despite these claims, the tobacco industry's promise of a 'smoke-free future' has been widely criticised as a public relations strategy aimed at improving its public image while influencing tobacco policy and ensuring a profitable future for investors through the introduction of alternative, yet equally addictive, nicotine products.33 Comparisons have been drawn to the numerous similar campaigns that have been employed by the tobacco industry to influence public perception and policymaking over the decades.33 For example, the 1950s ‘Frank Statement’ when tobacco companies attempted to deny the harms of smoking; the 1980s campaigns attempting to reverse the growing public sentiment that smoking was socially unacceptable; the 1990s campaigns addressing proposed actions by the US federal government to address high levels of smoking among young people; and campaigns from the early 2000s when the tobacco industry began presenting as ‘socially responsible’ amid a broader movement towards ‘corporate social responsibility’ (CSR) (See Section 10.11 for more on the tobacco industry and CSR).40 Public health academics believe that the primary motivation behind tobacco companies' current 'smoke-free future' campaign is to curb regulation, allowing them to retain traditional cigarette customers while also attracting new users of alternative nicotine products, thereby sustaining profitability into the future.40
For a detailed discussion of e-cigarettes, heated tobacco, and other nicotine products, see Chapter 18.
Philip Morris International Case Study:
In 2016, Philip Morris International (PMI) announced its goal ‘to give up cigarettes’ and create a ‘smoke-free future’.39 It said it would end the sale of combustible cigarettes entirely, and instead offer people who smoke alternatives, notably its heated tobacco product IQOS. PMI went on to launch a comprehensive global public relations campaign, seeking conversations with regulators to enable heated tobacco products to be introduced into key markets, and attempted to persuade the public that PMI was a part of the solution to the tobacco epidemic.41
In 2017, with the supposed objective of accelerating an end to smoking, Foundation for a Smoke-Free World (FSFW) (later changed to Global Action to End Smoking) was set up and solely funded by PMI. Investigative journalists alleged that FSFW was used by PMI to covertly circumvent the World Health Organization’s (WHO) FCTC policy that prohibited cooperation between the tobacco industry and government, and to encourage the WHO to reconsider its stance on ‘harm-reduction’ products. Internal documents also revealed that PMI intended to ‘divide and conquer’ tobacco control advocates and researchers ‘by exploiting the differences of opinion’. The FSFW’s attempts to influence WHO, however, were unsuccessful and after this PMI significantly reduced funding to FSFW.42
In 2020, Stopping Tobacco Organizations & Products (STOP) released a report tilted Addiction at Any Cost: Philip Morris International Uncovered examining whether PMI’s promise of transformation had any legitimacy.41 The report concluded that PMI’s claim of wanting to move away from cigarettes and create a ‘smoke-free future’ was illogical, highly disingenuous and dangerous to public health. PMI’s public statements about going ‘smoke-free’ were compared to its private investor facing strategies and marketing activities. The researchers found that PMI’s ‘smoke-free’ rhetoric was a calculated corporate affairs strategy used to renormalise its company brand. Instead of supporting public health goals, the authors found PMI continued to contest and challenge evidence-based tobacco control measures, heavily market cigarettes, including to young people, introduce new cigarette brands and acquire new cigarette companies.41
In 2024, research into Philip Morris’s commitment to reduce cigarette shipments by 2025, as part of its ‘transformation’, found PMI’s target to have been highly conservative. The target would have been met regardless based on pre-existing trends in declining cigarette shipments. Even so, PMI is not on track to meet its own conservative target, as the data showed that from 2020 declines in sales stabilised, while at the same time PMI introduced its heated tobacco products driving extra revenue for the company. The authors suggest that, rather than a genuine transformation towards a ‘smoke-free future’, PMI is seeking to harness interest in public health and ‘harm reduction’ to secure influence and undermine progress in tobacco control.43
Test your knowledge
References
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