13.10 Arguments against tax increases

The tobacco industry recognises the effectiveness of tax increases in decreasing smoking and therefore sales volumes. Internal documents from Philip Morris and British American Tobacco, released as part of settlement of litigation by US attorneys-general against these companies, included the following statements:

Of all the concerns there is one–taxation–that alarms us the most. While marketing restrictions and public and passive smoking do depress volume, in our experience taxation depresses it much more severely. Our concern for taxation is therefore central to our thinking about smoking and health.¹  Increases in taxation, which reduce consumption, may mean the destruction of the vitality of the tobacco industry.²

It is not surprising, then, that the tobacco industry and its allies have a history of vehement opposition to large increases in taxes. The World Health Organization categorises the tobacco industry’s efforts to avoid, delay, or dilute tobacco taxation policy into five themes, referred to as SCARE tactics. These tactics are summarised below, while more detail and recommendations on how to develop strong policy and counter industry arguments and interference, are available in the WHO Technical Manual on Tobacco Tax Policy and Administration.³

• S: Smuggling and illicit trade

Opponents of tobacco taxation may argue that increasing tobacco taxes results in a price difference between countries that incentivises smuggling and counterfeit tobacco production. The industry has been very successful in getting this argument into public discourse, but there is little real-world evidence to support it.⁴ This idea greatly oversimplifies the relationship between illicit trade and tobacco prices: in reality, illicit trade is primarily facilitated by weak tax administration and lack of enforcement.^3,5,6

• C: Court and legal challenges

The tobacco industry has a long history of being highly litigious, challenging apparent weaknesses in tobacco control policies in courts and international tribunals, aiming to overturn, weaken or delay policy. Ongoing legal action in other countries can also have a chilling effect, where other countries pause their efforts to strengthen policy while they await the outcome of legal action.⁷ While tobacco taxation attracts legal challenges less often than other types of policies, it is essential that tobacco tax policy is well designed and serves to protect population health.³

• A: Anti-poor rhetoric

The notion that tobacco tax increases are regressive, in that they have a disproportionate impact on disadvantaged people who smoke, has been widely debated. In fact, it is tobacco use itself that has a much more significant negative impact on disadvantaged populations, and these groups stand to gain the most in terms of health, social, and economic benefits from reduced tobacco use.^3,5,6

• R: Revenue reduction

This argument suggests that very large increases in tobacco tax result threatens government revenue, by reducing tax income as tobacco use reduces, or people who smoke switch to lower-taxed or illicit products. There is a large body of international evidence that this has not occurred, even in high-taxing countries with declining smoking prevalence.³  This argument is discussed further in the Australian context in Section 13.10.3 below, and data on tobacco tax revenues in Australia over time are presented in Section 13.7.

• E: Employment

This argument, and the one above, frames tobacco taxes as an economic issue rather than a public health concern. Arguments against tax increases that focus on employment are more common in countries where tobacco is grown and manufactured, often overstating the profitability and sustainability of tobacco production.³ This employment argument is discussed further in the Australian context in Section 13.10.1 below. An analysis of debates concerning tax increases in the French parliament between 2010 and 2020 found that economic and social costs, particularly costs to tobacconists, were by far the most common arguments used to oppose tax increases.⁸

In Australia, debates about tobacco taxation commonly involve alarm about illicit trade (S) and impacts on disadvantaged populations (A).^9-11 These are comprehensively discussed in InDepth 13A and Section 13.11, respectively. Debate about the impact of high levels of tobacco excise on government revenue (R) has become more prominent (see below).

Several other arguments have been used by the tobacco industry to oppose tax policy in Australia in the early 1980s to mid-1990s, such as in submissions to government inquiries,^12,13 including:

• The tobacco industry is important to Australia’s economy
• Increases in the price of tobacco are inflationary
• Tax increases have unintended consequences, forcing consumers to switch to more harmful products
• Tobacco taxes are paternalistic, and governments should ‘stay out of peoples’ lives’

These arguments have not been openly articulated by tobacco companies in recent years, most likely because the economic arguments have clearly been at odds with governments’ experience with tax increases over three decades since the 1980s, and the degree of self-interest of the paternalism argument would be too obvious. These arguments, and the notion of threatened government revenue (R), are discussed in Sections 13.10.1 to 13.10.5.

13.10.1 Do increases in tobacco taxes threaten Australia’s economy?

Tobacco has not been grown commercially in Australia since the 1990s, and the manufacture of tobacco products in Australia ceased in 2016 (see Sections 10.1 and 10.3). Relatively few people are employed by the tobacco companies that operate in Australia (see Section 10.3). Even prior to the cessation of tobacco agriculture and manufacture, there was no evidence to support the idea that tobacco taxes would increase unemployment. A 2009 economic analysis by Collins and Lapsley¹⁴ demonstrated that the flow-on effects of employment in the tobacco industry were dwarfed by the social costs of tobacco use in Australia. As they, and economist Ken Warner, point out, any reductions in tobacco-dependent employment resulting from increases in tobacco tax increases would be offset by increases in employment in other sectors as spending on tobacco products is replaced by spending on other goods and services.^14,15

The number of people involved in selling tobacco products at the retail level is difficult to estimate, but the majority would be involved in businesses that sell additional products to tobacco. The tobacco industry has on occasion argued that increasing taxes reduces the viability of small convenience stores that rely on the foot traffic generated by customers coming in with the intention of buying cigarettes and then purchasing other products as well. However, research carried out in New Zealand¹⁶ the UK¹⁷ and Australia¹⁸ all demonstrate that the unplanned purchases associated with tobacco purchases are relatively minor. Similarly, a careful analysis of changes in the number of convenience stores in business for 50 states and the District of Columbia in the US between 1997 and 2009 showed that these were unrelated to changes in state tobacco tax levels.¹⁹

13.10.2  Are increases in taxes on tobacco products inflationary?

Very large increases in the price of tobacco products could affect the Consumer Price Index (CPI) of a country, particularly if smoking prevalence and daily tobacco consumption were high. Tobacco products are included in the ‘basket of goods’ used to estimate consumption expenditure in the population that underpins the CPI in Australia. This concern—and conversely the decline in smoking prevalence—led to calls to remove of tobacco from the CPI basket of goods in the 1990s.²⁰ The Australian Bureau of Statistics and most economists have opposed the exclusion of tobacco from the CPI on technical grounds. The integrity of the index relies on a very high degree of consistency over time and with other jurisdictions internationally. A way around the problems of the inflationary impact of increases in tobacco prices would be to use an adjusted form of CPI that excludes tobacco and alcohol as the index used for wage increases and indexation of pension and benefits. This has been done in Luxembourg, France and Belgium since the early 1990s.²¹ This way, increases in the price of cigarettes are not offset by increases in those wages, benefits and pensions that are regularly increased in line with the CPI.

Concerns about the inflationary effects of tobacco price increases have waned over time in an era of much lower rate of inflation and as the cigarettes and tobacco sub-group has come to make up a progressively smaller component of the overall CPI. In Australia, the CPI is reviewed regularly to take account of changing patterns of consumer spending (determined by household expenditure surveys), and the subindices are reweighted accordingly after each review.²² The changing weightings of the cigarettes and tobacco sub-group are set out in Table 13.10.1

13.10.2.1  What happens when governments don’t increase tobacco taxes?

Without real increases in the level of taxes, tobacco products will become more affordable as people’s incomes rise.²³ Even with regular indexation based on cost-of-living indexes (such as the Consumer Price Index), products will become more affordable if peoples’ wages rise by more than the inflation rate. (This was the reason that in 2014 Australia shifted to twice-yearly increases based on wage growth rather than changes of cost-of-living—see Section 13.6.3.4.)^24,25

Evidence from the UK²⁶ and Australia²⁷ and internationally²⁸ has demonstrated that when taxes increase, tobacco companies frequently increase their prices well beyond that required by the tax increase (see Section 13.4.6.1). Over periods in both countries where taxes did not increase in real terms, prices of tobacco products still rose substantially, driven by increases in tobacco industry margins but no increase to government revenue.²⁹ This is demonstrated by the shaded portion of Figure 13.10.1, which shows that the Australian tobacco index of the CPI outpaced increases in the total CPI during an extended period of no additional increases to tobacco taxation other than indexation in the 2000s. The price of tobacco prices continued to rise, resulting in the tobacco index increasing by almost 70% between 2001 and 2009.

13.10.3 Do very high tobacco taxes threaten government revenue?

The tobacco industry has on occasion attempted to argue that increasing tobacco taxes will eventually cause a decline in government revenue due to reduced use of taxed tobacco products across the population, and greater tax avoidance and illicit tobacco use. In the Australian Government’s 2022–23 Final Budget Outcome, the total receipts for tobacco excise were $0.2 billion lower than expected, prompting debate about the relationship between high tobacco excise and increases in illicit tobacco trade of tobacco tax revenues.³⁰

While long-term declines in tobacco use will eventually decrease tax revenue, the fact that tax makes up less than 100% of price combined with the fact that price elasticity is well under –1.0 ensures that almost any modest increase in the tax rate will result in additional revenue. (This is because the percentage increase in the tax rate will exceed the percentage increase in the price and the consequent percentage decline in consumption.) Initial increases in revenues prompted by tax increases can thus be expected to continue for many years, well above pre-tax levels.^6,23,31 Regular tax increases are necessary to at least maintain government revenue in real terms as inflation erodes the real value of tax revenues over time.

In recent years in Australia, opponents have argued that large tax increases have helped drive increases in use of illicit tobacco which has resulted in lower-than-expected levels of government revenue. It is true that the proportion of Australian adults reporting at least occasionally using illegally sold tobacco and tobacco products has increased in Australia between 2019 and 2022–23—see Section 13.A.5, This has no doubt contributed to several downward revisions in expected Government revenue from customs and excise duty on tobacco, and a large reduction in the total amount of revenue received each year since 2021. However, declines in prevalence of population smoking have also been an important driver of reduced tobacco excise and customs revenue—see Section 13.5.

In countries such as the UK which has vigorously enforced laws requiring payments of duty, the extent of evasion declined for an extended period over a period that included several large tax increases.³² International evidence suggests that it is the quality of tax administration and the vigour of enforcement efforts that determine the size of the illicit tobacco market rather than the level of tobacco taxes. In fact, higher taxing countries tend to have lower levels of tax evasion—refer Section 13A.6.

13.10.4 Do tax increase have unintended consequences on smoking behaviour?

All policies have ‘downsides’ or costs as well as benefits. Opponents of tax increases have previously argued that people may make product-related changes in response to a price increase. A 1998 study often cited by proponents of this argument by Evans and Farrelly³³ found that people in high-taxing states in the US were more likely to switch to high-tar cigarettes to maintain nicotine intake. There is no evidence of such a phenomenon having ever occurred in Australia, where the move away from high-tar brands began in the 1970s.^34-38 Euromonitor International reported continuing declines over the 2000s, including a decline of 9% in 2010.³⁹ Machine measured tar levels have not been reported on cigarette packaging since 2006 in Australia. While increases in taxes have been associated with some engagement in price-minimising behaviours in preference to reducing their smoking (see Section 13.8.5.1) these changes do not necessarily result in any greater harm for continuing smokers. While use of roll-your-own tobacco may have increased in Australia following increases in taxes on tobacco products,^39,40 there is no evidence that the level of risk to health is different for roll-your-own compared to manufactured cigarettes—see Section 3.27.1.

Others may point to examples of people who stop smoking may experiencing weight gain, with some even suggesting rising obesity is associated with increases in taxes on tobacco.⁴¹ This proposition is not supported in a much more sophisticated analysis in 2009, which showed the opposite effect.⁴² Obesity is a serious problem in Australia, but the contribution of smoking cessation to this is minor, ^43,44 and the health risks of continuing to smoke are not proportionate to the risks associated with gaining weight—see Section 3.27.

13.10.5 Are tobacco taxes paternalistic and overly coercive?

The idea that governments should not interfere in people’s lives is attractive in theory, and still used to oppose tobacco taxation internationally.^8,45 But, about 2.3 million Australians smoked in 2022,⁴⁶ and studies have shown that 90% of people who smoke regret that they ever started.⁴⁷ Smoking imposes a cost to all taxpayers, but this pales into insignificance compared to the costs experienced by individual who smoke, and businesses who employ them, in terms of lost productivity, healthcare costs, and social costs. People living in households with people who smoke also experience these costs, and are significantly impacted by smoking-related disease. Reducing smoking helps people live more productive and healthier lives, requiring less government intervention and support in the long-run.

Increasing tobacco tax has been just one part of the comprehensive strategy for reducing harm caused by tobacco adopted by Australian governments over time.^48,49,50 These strategies have also included progressive elimination of all forms of promotion of tobacco products, mandating of clear and comprehensive consumer information, substantial funding of education campaigns, widespread smokefree areas, services to quitters and subsidy of pharmaceuticals to help quitters cope with withdrawal symptoms. While all these strategies are valuable, tax increases are by far the most reliable and effective way of reducing consumption, with effects far stronger and more immediate than for other tobacco-control interventions.^51-53

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