The document disclosure discussed in an earlier section (Chapter 10, Section 10.9) brought the tobacco industry collectively to a point in the late-1990s where it could no longer deny that its products were harmful. The seismic effects of the revelations contained in the documents, combined with ongoing investigations, litigation and pressure for product regulation, legislation and restrictions on smoking, required tobacco companies to construct and promote a new image to maintain investor confidence, and boost employee morale.1 The companies began to acknowledge publicly that while tobacco could be harmful, smoking was an individual ‘adult choice’ and tobacco should be ‘sensibly’ regulated.
What is CSR?
The tobacco industry’s public attempts at rebirth are to be understood within a much broader move in the corporate world towards ‘corporate social responsibility’ (CSR), in which transnational corporations have been pressured to consider their impact on society and the environment, and adjust their business practices accordingly, albeit as a voluntary gesture, rather than by government-mandated regulation.2 The corporate world's shift towards CSR has given rise to a proliferation of what have been described as 'washing' strategies, whereby a company gains a more favourable public image while avoiding the negative consequences of implementing genuinely meaningful change.3 Within the tobacco industry, the most notable example being 'greenwashing'.4
As a consequence of strengthening tobacco control measures adopted by governments globally as well as critical analysis of the ‘corporate social responsibility’ narrative, the tobacco industry has begun to avoid calling its activities CSR and instead has begun to refer to them as sustainability activities.5
Is the tobacco industry and CSR inherently contradictory?
The tobacco industry defends its claim to corporate social responsibility by appealing to the legal status of tobacco products, and by framing smoking as an informed, adult choice (see Section 10A.2.1 for tobacco control responses to these freedom-of-choice arguments). The emphasis on the individual’s choice to smoke is used to absolve the industry and shift responsibility to the individual.6 One study7 noted however that, ‘As long as cigarettes kill active and passive users, all that a tobacco company can achieve is a reputation for transactional integrity.i When tobacco companies try to link their activities to the common good, they indeed provoke the legitimate question [of] whether tobacco and CSR are inherently contradictory’ (p398).7
The argument has been made that the tobacco industry is fundamentally precluded from qualifying as a socially responsible corporation for several interrelated reasons.2
- Tobacco has a devastating effect on the health of its users, as well as a subset of non-users who are exposed to it
- Tobacco is addictive
- Most people who continue to smoke would like to quit but have been unable to do so
- People with mental illness consume a large proportion of the total amount of tobacco used in any country
- Most people who smoke become addicted before they have the opportunity to exercise adult choice (i.e. smoking uptake occurs during adolescence).
In order to become truly socially responsible, tobacco companies might instead:6
- Stop all forms of tobacco advertising and promotion
- Support substantial price rises for tobacco products
- Stop interfering with provisions to protect non-smokers from secondhand smoke
- Adopt generic packaging with large graphic health warnings covering every established health risk of smoking
- Support effective development of and comply with regulation of marketing, manufacturing and sales according to best practice (mandated by government)
- Pay fees to government that enable public health authorities to operate effective public education and to subsidise or fund pharmaceutical and behavioural support to quit
- Abandon aggressive tactics for growth in less developed countries
- Halt all forms of political donation and other means of influencing political decision-making
- Stop obstructing countries from ratifying the WHO FCTC and adoption of its provisions.
Because there is no widely agreed upon framework for CSR specifying minimum standards of social performance, tobacco companies are able to present themselves as socially responsible, regardless of the harms for which they may be responsible.8
In 2008, WHO listed CSR among the many strategies used by the tobacco industry as a tactic for resisting effective tobacco control, with the goal of CSR being ‘To promote voluntary measures as an effective way to address tobacco control and create an illusion of being a ‘changed’ company and to establish partnerships with health interests’.1
Article 5.3 of the WHO Framework Convention on Tobacco Control recommend CSR activities be denormalised.9 The guidelines outline eight key recommendations, including recommendation six to ‘Denormalize and, to the extent possible, regulate activities described as “socially responsible” by the tobacco industry, including but not limited to activities described as “corporate social responsibility”.’9 WHO FCTC Article 13 Guidelines call for a ban on corporate social responsibility (CSR) as it constitutes a form of advertising and promotion, and contributions from tobacco companies to any other entity for ‘socially responsible causes’ is a form of sponsorship and should be banned.10
Implementation of the WHO FCTC has been recognised as playing an integral role in the attainment of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (see Section 19.1.2). As part of Sustainable Development Goal (SDG) 3, Target 3.a specifies that UN member states must strengthen the implementation of the WHO FCTC, as appropriate. Tobacco, along with alcohol, is the only consumer product to be specifically mentioned in the Agenda for Sustainable Development.11 Despite this, the tobacco industry has embraced the UN’s SDGs within its larger CSR agenda. All four of the large tobacco companies have been cited incorporating the 17 SDGs in their own sustainability reporting.11 For example, in its 2020 human rights report, BAT asserts that its non-combustible tobacco products support the SDG3 aim to ensure healthy lives and promote well-being despite its long history of opposing the WHO FCTC.12 Researchers point out that this is merely the latest manifestation of an old tobacco industry tactic ‘to claim a role as a legitimate partner in discussions of public health’, while attempting to circumvent tobacco control measures.11,4 Researchers have also noted the tobacco industry’s strategy of leveraging conflicting SDGs (e.g. economy and health) pointing to SDG 17 (on Public-Private Engagement) to justify their involvement in government.4
The Global Tobacco Industry Interference Index (Global Tobacco Index) is a survey that monitors publicly available information on government responses from 100 countries (Australia not included) to tobacco industry interference, including tobacco industry CSR, as required under Article 5.3 of the WHO FCTC.5 Of the 100 countries included in the 2025 report, 32 had banned tobacco-related CSR activities, and a further five did not endorse or accept any contributions from the tobacco industry. However, the report found that 18 governments had collaborated with the tobacco industry, and various ministers and parliamentarians in at least eight countries, including the UK, had endorsed tobacco industry CSR activities.5
How the tobacco industry benefits from CSR activities
- Pre-emptive self-regulation and regulatory avoidance
CSR is used by the tobacco industry to set its own minimum standards of performance; prevent effective government regulation by offering voluntary forms of corporate governance instead; and is used as leverage to weaken or avoid regulation.8,13
- Marketing, promotion and public relations (PR)
In an age where most tobacco advertising, marketing and promotion is banned, CSR activities, rebranding initiatives, and commercial communications are used as promotional vehicles (see Section 11.11.2).14,15 Reporting on and publicising CSR activities, as well as gaining positive press attention and publicity through the accumulation of CSR awards,16 or through donations, improves tobacco companies’ corporate image,1 enhances their credibility,13 and helps to restore the their negative reputation.1,8
- Policy access and political influence
CSR activities, and CSR-related award ceremonies, allow the tobacco industry to gain access to, and influence, policymakers.13,17 These activities are used to distract governments and the public from the tobacco industry’s enormous harm.1
- Stakeholder and alliance management
CSR initiatives are used to improve employee morale,1 maintain and increase the value of company stock, as well as investor confidence,1 and create industry allies.13
- Legitimacy and normalisation
CSR allows the tobacco industry to claim a role as a legitimate partner in discussions of public health,11 normalising the tobacco industry’s involvement in government and society.
Examples of tobacco industry CSR activities
10.11.1 Ethical responsibility
Pressure to address child labour from the UN International Labour Organization (ILO) in the late 1990s onwards resulted in an industry-wide CSR response by tobacco companies, with initiatives falling under several common themes:18 Education initiatives, including programs supporting the education and training of child labourers, and raising awareness among farmers of the risks of child labour; economic empowerment initiatives to enhance the welfare and economic empowerment of tobacco farming communities; and the strengthening of internal legal and regulatory frameworks (self-regulation) to reduce child labour. Researchers have criticised these approaches for failing to remedy the systemic or structural issues involved in child labour, and, in the case of legal and regulatory frameworks, for using this avenue to engage with government and influence policy.18 See Section 10.14 for a comprehensive look at research into the exploitation of farm workers, the use of child labour, occupational health and safety risks for tobacco workers, and methods used for testing products.
In 2016, Philip Morris International (PMI) engaged The Danish Institute for Human Rights to produce a human rights assessment of the company. The conclusion of the assessment was that ‘Tobacco is deeply harmful to human health, and there can be no doubt that the production and marketing of tobacco is irreconcilable with the human right to health. For the tobacco industry, the UNGPs [UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights] therefore require the cessation of the production and marketing of tobacco.’19
Despite this clear and definitive assessment of the tobacco industry’s incompatibility with the human right to health, four years later, in 2020 (on Human Rights Day, December 10th), British American Tobacco (BAT) published a report titled ‘Journey to a Better Tomorrow: Human Rights Report 2020’. The report did not make any statements about ending the marketing and sale of tobacco, (despite the UNDGPs prior advice to PMI); nor did it suggest it would end its ongoing opposition to tobacco control efforts.12 Researchers12 criticised the 2020 report for its ‘spin’ and hypocrisy, pointing out that BAT’s stated commitments to human rights were merely commitments to its reporting and training standards, rather than concrete business changes, and that BATs ‘efforts’ in human rights were at a level so insufficient that they had often left farmers, children and the environment worse off.12 Finally, the researchers pointed out that BAT’s actions continue to hinder plans to integrate human rights perspectives into tobacco control policy.12
10.11.1.1 Environmental responsibility
Much of the tobacco industry’s environmentally focused CSR activities have been criticised as ‘Greenwashing’—a PR and marketing tactic whereby ‘disinformation [is] disseminated by an organisation so as to present an environmentally responsible public image’.4 Greenwashing tactics by the tobacco industry divert attention away from important issues such as deforestation caused by tobacco growing, towards short-term publicity stunts such as tree planting programs, while governments are left to absorb the long-term costs associated with deforestation (see Section 10.15.1 for comprehensive information on land clearing and deforestation).5 Common tobacco industry funded CSR greenwashing initiatives include anti-littering campaigns, clean up and recycling initiatives. This tactic helps the industry avoid being regulated or penalised, for damaging the environment (see Section 10.16.5.2 for more).5
In 2023 the Australian government revoked British American Tobacco Australia's ‘carbon neutral’ certification granted under the Climate Active scheme after a complaint was made that it breached Australia's WHO FCTC obligations.20 In July 2026, the Australian government announced it was ending the Climate Active certification scheme.21
See Section 10.15 for comprehensive information on the environmental impacts of tobacco production. And see also Section 10.16 exploring the environmental harms caused by tobacco product waste. For information about ‘Greenwashing’ in the marketing of tobacco products and packaging see Section 10.6.1.4.
10.11.1.2 Environmental, Social and Governance (ESG) reporting
Environmental, social and governance (ESG) reporting is a tool that tobacco companies use to secure investor, policymaker and consumer confidence.22 ESG covers:
- Environment: climate risks and environmental concerns
- Social: labour issues, human rights and consumers’ and stakeholders’ concerns
- Governance: corporate governance and behaviour including board effectiveness.22
Tobacco companies document their CSR activities in these reports and, due to the nature of self-reporting, are able to selectively disclose and omit information. These reports are then made public on their websites for investors while also being accessible to the general public.14,23
A 2020 report by STOP22 argued that tobacco companies use of ESG reporting contravenes WHO FCTC Article 5.3 and Article 13, as ESG reporting facilitates promotion of tobacco companies through CSR activities, while at the same time obscuring the significant harm their product causes. The report recommends that tobacco industry ESG reporting be banned.
10.11.1.3 Diversity, equity and inclusion
The tobacco industry is known to actively seek out and promote awards for its internal employee diversity despite its long history of targeting minority groups, including women, racial minorities, LGBTQI+ people, and Indigenous peoples, among others.16
See Section 11.11.2.1.1 for more examples of CSR promotion and diversity, equity and inclusion.
10.11.2 Philanthropic responsibility
A US study has documented how tobacco industry philanthropy may be harmful, particularly in terms of hindering tobacco control legislation. For example, Philip Morris has used philanthropy strategically not only to improve company image, but also to influence public health policies.25
For many charitable organisations and donors, tobacco industry philanthropic involvement may be a conflict of interest.26 For instance, in 2010, the Bill & Melinda Gates Foundation withdrew a grant of $5.2 million to Canada’s International Development Research Centre (IDRC), stating that, ‘the foundation was recently informed that the chair of the board of our partner, the International Development Research Centre (IDRC), has until recently also been a Director of Imperial Tobacco Canada, Ltd. We are deeply disappointed by this revelation and feel this conflict is unacceptable as we work to support meaningful tobacco control programs in Africa. Therefore, we are terminating our tobacco control grant to IDRC, effective immediately. We remain committed to tobacco control work and look forward to continuing to partner with the anti-tobacco community’.27
10.11.2.1 Education
As previously mentioned, child labour education programmes put forward by the tobacco industry as a CSR initiative have been criticised by researchers for failing to remedy the systemic or structural issues involved in child labour.18
School sponsorship, as a CSR strategy, benefits the tobacco industry as a form of indirect marketing. Research shows that tobacco industry-sponsored schools in rural China foster positive attitudes among educators, parents and students towards the tobacco industry, despite the general public having an understanding of the health consequences of smoking and there being a ban on direct marketing and advertising of tobacco in these areas.28
The concept ‘youthwashing’ has been coined to describe a specific form of CSR used by health harming industries and refers to ‘platforming youth voices in a performative and tokenistic way instead of acting on the concerns of these groups or including them in meaningful discussions about these issues’.3 Examples of youthwashing strategies include:3
- youth education programs (see Section 10.13.3 for research evaluating the ineffectiveness of industry funded anti-smoking advertising and education programs.)
- youth employment and training programs;
- sports activities; (see Section 10.11.2.2 below)
- youth events; e.g. the annual Battle of the Minds business and innovation competition run by BAT targeting university students.29
- youth-focused philanthropy’.
10.11.2.2 Sponsorship of sports and the Arts
Corporate sponsorship of sporting and cultural events was an important and highly effective vehicle for tobacco advertising in Australia before it was banned by a number of states during the late 1980s and finally by Commonwealth (national) legislation in 1992.ii As well as enhancing corporate image, sponsorship provided endless hours of visual and verbal brand exposure, linked cigarette brands with positive imagery and iconic events, created considerable support for the industry, and effectively gagged potential anti-smoking advocates (such as sportspeople whose sport benefited from tobacco funds).
See Section 11.7 for a case study on tobacco industry sports event sponsorship as a form of indirect advertising using Formula 1 (F1).
Historically, tobacco industry sponsorship of the arts has included art museums, dance troupes, opera companies, repertory theatres and ethnic arts organisations.30 Internationally, the tobacco industry continues to sponsor major arts institutions, such as the UK Royal Opera House, the London Symphony Orchestra, the London Symphony Orchestra and the Kuala Lumpur Performing Arts Centre.31 As well as museums such as the Smithsonian and The Royal Academy of Arts.30 Tobacco industry sponsorship of these high class, or ‘classic’ arts institutions, may promote good will among influential audiences, and provide the tobacco industry with access to people and institutions who are useful for lobbying purposes (e.g. PM, during the 90s in New York, pressured the arts institutions it sponsored to lobby against anti-smoking legislation).30
10.11.2.3 Supporting charities
Charitable donations by the tobacco industry appear to be motivated by enhancing their reputation and gaining access to influential people, rather than genuine efforts to support social causes. For example, in 2001, Philip Morris spent more on publicising its charitable donations than it did on the donations themselves.32
Tobacco companies have a history of supporting charities and groups with impeccable public images, including aid for sick children, combating domestic violence and environmental stewardship.
In 1999, Philip Morris Australia claimed it supported a number of Australian charities, including Jeans for Genes Day, Red Nose Day,iii the Lions Club and Ronald McDonald children’s charities. None of these charities had knowingly accepted donations from Philip Morris, since the money had either been received via a corporate entity related to Philip Morris Australia (for example, Kraftiv—which owns Vegemite and other iconic food brands) or because donations had been made through employees of Philip Morris Australia apparently acting on their own behalf, rather than at the behest of the company. The revelation that donations were from a tobacco company caused consternation among the charities.33
In February of 2003, Philip Morris Australia co-sponsored a high-profile conference on domestic violence, organised by the Australian Government’s Office for the Status of Women.34,35 Along with the then Minister for Family and Community Services, Senator Amanda Vanstone, Philip Morris representatives from Australia and the US spoke at the event.36 The Office for the Status of Women was strongly criticised by representatives of the Australian Medical Association,34,35 the Federal Opposition,34 and the public health sector,35 on the grounds that tobacco is a major cause of mortality among women, and that acceptance of tobacco sponsorship detracted from the importance of the issue of domestic violence, while enhancing the corporate image of Philip Morris Australia. Subsequent efforts by tobacco companies to involve themselves in Australian conferences were less successful; protests by other companies at times led to their removal from the program,37 or other companies to withdraw.38
Nevertheless, British American Tobacco Australia appears to have had some success in forging connections with several ‘charity partners’v through the ‘Our Workplace Giving Programme.’39 Employees may choose to make donations either through payroll contributions or through approved on-site fundraising programs. One such charity is Assistance Dogs Australia, which provides services to the blind. Noting the well-established connection between smoking and blindness,vi one commentator has described this as an especially cynically calculated partnership.40
On its international website, Philip Morris International pledges support for four defined areas: ‘education, empowering women, economic opportunity, as well as disaster preparedness and relief efforts.’vii In 2015, Philip Morris donated $15,000 to ‘Aussie Helpers Limited’, $10,000 to ‘Lifeline Australia’, and $20,000 to ‘Habitat for Humanity Australia (Victoria) Inc’.41 In 2017, Philip Morris International donated US $40,000 to Australian social welfare and housing charity, Habitat for Humanity Australia.42 Beyond 2017, PMI has made no other donations to Australia listed in its Social Contributions disclosure reports, apart from a 2020 donation to Australia for bushfire relief discussed below (see Section 10.11.2.4 Donations to disasters).
In the US, Philip Morris has run television advertising campaigns informing the public of its good works, such as funding shelters for the homeless, food donations for the needy and programs against domestic violence.43 Philip Morris spent millions more dollars on publicising its charitable works than it actually donated.36 This advertising also allowed Philip Morris to generate its own positive publicity in mainstream media despite direct tobacco advertising being banned on television in the US.44 While some charitable organisations have rejected tobacco industry funds,45 the American Red Cross has defied the recommended policy of its parent movement, the International Red Cross, and continues to accept substantial tobacco industry donations.46
10.11.2.4 Donations to disasters
Disaster relief initiatives, like other CSR initiatives, provide the tobacco industry with good PR and brand promotion.47 For example, in response to Australia’s 2009 ‘Black Saturday’ bushfires, Swedish Match received positive media publicity after reporting they had made a cash donation to the Australian Salvation Army. A spokesperson for the charity later reported that the donation received from Swedish Match had been $500.32 Philip Morris International also pledged donations to Australia for bushfire relief, this time in 2020, when Australia’s bushfires were garnering international media coverage. PMI published a news feature on its website promoting its ‘Relief for Australia’ campaign to raise money and encouraged staff to donate through PMI’s ‘Projects with a Heart’ employee association – which enables internal charity projects. PMI also pledged to make a corporate donation of $200,000 to unspecified non-government organisations involved in the bushfire disaster relief.48 No follow-up PR was published, however, PMI’s 2020 Social Contributions disclosure listed one entry for Australia, specifically RSPCA Australia (an animal welfare charity), to the amount of US$124,378, significantly less than the $200,000 pledged in its PR release.49
As well as PR and brand promotion, disaster relief initiatives offer tobacco companies opportunities to influence political and policymaking groups by cultivating (buying) goodwill and credibility,47 and initiatives can also be strategic, in that relief is more readily provided in geographic locations that are close to tobacco company headquarters, key offices, business relations and tobacco-growing communities, understood as ‘home region effect’.47
10.11.2.4.1 The tobacco industry’s COVID-19 response
The tobacco industry's response to the COVID-19 pandemic exemplifies corporate social responsibility (CSR) as a strategic business tool, rather than philanthropy. Alongside high-profile donations that generated favourable global media coverage, the industry pursued pandemic-themed marketing, positioned itself through vaccine research as a public health actor, sought to influence the scientific record through industry-linked research, and exploited governments' pandemic-era vulnerability to advance political lobbying and policy interference. During COVID-19 the tobacco industry donated relief money, personal protective equipment, ventilators, hand sanitizer, testing kits, and other resources, which all garnered much global media coverage.50,51 Philip Morris International, for instance, spent around US$60 million on social contributions in 2020, including donations related to the COVID-19 pandemic.52 Altria, in 2020, announced an initial US$1 million to support COVID-19 relief efforts.53
At the same time, tobacco and e-cigarette companies engaged in pandemic-themed marketing. Tobacco companies, including PMI with its new heated tobacco product, offered free express contactless home delivery options in parts of the world during lockdown, undermining minimum age purchase restrictions, and promoted pandemic-themed discounts on products.54,55 During this time while many were isolated in lockdown, and relying heavily on the internet for social connections, social media influencers, celebrities and websites were used to market new nicotine products.56 Moreover, COVID-19 related health equipment used for promotion,56 for example BAT donated branded sanitizer and face masks to social media influencers in Kazakhstan.55
Researchers have also noted that tobacco industry pharmaceutical ‘wellness’ acquisitions were also part of its larger CSR strategy.23 Tobacco companies, during the COVID-19 pandemic, took the opportunity to promote themselves as pharmaceutical and public health organisations, rather than cigarette manufacturers.57 British American Tobacco (BAT) and Medicago—a biotechnology specialist based in Quebec and partly owned at the time by Philip Morris International (PMI)—both explored developing COVID-19 vaccines in early 2020 using tobacco plant technology. As Medicago was collaborating with the Canadian government, the World Health Organization warned governments about engaging with the tobacco industry over the development of coronavirus vaccines. Signatories to WHO's Framework Convention on Tobacco Control are restricted in dealing with the industry under the terms of Article 5.3 of that Convention.58
The tobacco industry has also been involved in research examining links between smoking and the risk of COVID-1957—see Section 3.9.12.4.
Researchers note that the pandemic offered tobacco companies opportunities to forge direct links with health sectors internationally, as many governments were desperate for assistance.52,57 During the COVID-19 pandemic, the shift to virtual meetings made it hard for advocacy groups to keep track of interactions between tobacco industry lobbyists and politicians.52
Corporate makeover: Philip Morris and Altria—a case study in brief
Of all the international tobacco companies seeking to redefine themselves, Philip Morris has gone to greatest lengths. From about the mid-1990s,2 Philip Morris management attempted to frame the company as an honest and ethical business, predicated on the fact that it produced legal products for use by informed adults. As part of this strategy, the company undertook (and publicised) social and environmental good works, pledged to operate more openly, and voiced support for reasonable regulation. It also adopted a consistent approach globally to matters such as marketing, trade, labour and the environment. Despite Philip Morris’ claims, however, its approach was highly selective. Strategies such as corporate advertising and industry-created youth smoking prevention programs, philanthropy, sponsorships, and support for weak tobacco control policies were implemented, while other areas that might have interfered with its business goals were ignored.59 An analysis60 of its website found that while the company appeared to endorse mainstream medical views on tobacco, its language was non-committal and visitors were referred to external public health websites (see also Chapter 10, Section 10.12). Internal Philip Morris documents revealed that its endorsement of such views primarily aimed to deflect litigation.60
In January 2003 Philip Morris Companies, then parent company to Philip Morris International, Philip Morris (USA) and Kraft Foods,viii changed its name to ‘Altria’. According to Philip Morris, the word Altria is derived from the Latin word ‘altus’, and conveys the notion of ‘reaching ever higher’.61 Various commentators have interpreted the name change as a public relations gesture, aimed at distancing the parent company and its non-tobacco subsidiaries from the stigma of association with tobacco manufacturing.62,63 This view has been confirmed by internal company documents dating back to the late 1980s.61 This campaign of corporate rehabilitation was met with confusion and mistrust by Philip Morris Company employees who were unconvinced that company could now responsibly sell it products while also continuing with aggressive promotion initiatives.64
In March 2008, Altria spun off Philip Morris International to make it a stand-alone company based in Switzerland. While Altria justified the initiative as motivated by a desire to ‘improve focus on the different market dynamics, competitive frameworks, challenges and opportunities that Altria and PMI face’,65 other commentators observed that cordoning off Philip Morris International would make the new entity less vulnerable to US regulators, legislators and litigants and reduce public relations pressure on Altria, which would continue to manage Philip Morris’s US operations.66 US ownership of Philip Morris International restricted its opportunities for global growth. As the split between the companies became imminent, a host of innovative product developments, which might have been expected to receive strong opposition in the US, were announced for introduction to Philip Morris International’s overseas markets.66 As of August 2017, Altria comprised a group of companies that includes: Philip Morris USA, US Smokeless Tobacco Company, John Middleton (a cigar company), Ste. Michelle Wine Estates, and Nu Mark, makers of e-vapour products.67
Altria was the only tobacco company to support the US Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act, enacted in 2009, which gave limited powers to the US Food and Drugs Administration to regulate tobacco products. Some public health experts expressed concern that the Act could offer the tobacco industry a further opportunity to rehabilitate its image and products because they are now ‘FDA regulated’.68
For more examples of tobacco company ‘transformations’, including a case study looking at Philip Morris International’s (PMIs) goal ‘to give up cigarettes’ and create a ‘smoke-free future’, see Section 10.13.4.
10.11.3 Corporate tax avoidance
Multinational tax avoidance by large companies has been the subject of public debate and scrutiny in Australia for many years,69 as it has internationally. A 2019 report by the Tax Justice Network70 posed the question: Are tobacco companies making a fair tax contribution to the societies where their profit-making activities cause the greatest human and economic costs? The report examined tax payments by British American Tobacco in Bangladesh, Indonesia, Brazil, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, Kenya, Uganda and Zambia. It focused on British American Tobacco due to its size, and the countries listed for their lower income status, geographic spread and the availability of records.
By reducing profits in some countries and shifting funds to lesser-taxing jurisdictions, multinational companies can minimise their tax contributions. Mechanisms used to shift money around the world include:
- paying royalties and fees, such as for the use of brands and trademarks, to a related company that owns the intellectual property
- making loans between subsidiaries of the same company (if withholding tax on the interest is lower than the corporate tax rate in the borrowing subsidiary’s country, overall tax will be lower)
- centralising procurement (for example, purchase of tobacco leaf) so that profits are booked in jurisdictions with lower tax rates.70
The Tax Justice Network report, Ashes to Ashes, concluded that British American Tobacco (BAT) was systematically shifting profits out of low and middle-income countries to avoid paying the full corporate income tax due in these countries. It estimated that for every dollar BAT paid in tax around the world, it shifted more than half a dollar that would have been taxed locally into a London office where it paid almost no income tax (and none at all between 2011 and 2014), using practices detailed above. This contradicts the principle that profits should be paid in the location where underlying, real economic activity occurs.
The report estimated that a total of US$58.2 million in tax was lost to Bangladesh, Indonesia, Brazil, Guyana, Trinidad and Tobago, Kenya, Uganda and Zambia in a single year due to profit shifting by BAT. It estimated that by 2020, these countries would lose nearly US$700 million in taxes due to be paid by BAT, if business continued as usual. This was despite a critical need for additional tax revenue in low and middle-income countries to meet the United Nations Sustainable Development Goals.71,72 For context, an estimated US$14 million a year in tax lost to Indonesia would cover the country’s yearly per capita health expenditure for 125,000 citizens.73
In a response to the report, BAT said it fully complied with all applicable tax legislation in the countries where it operated and made a significant tax contribution to governments worldwide. The Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids, which provided support for the Tax Justice Network report, said: “The report paints a picture of a company intent on maximising profits for its shareholders – the overwhelming majority of which live in high-income countries – and paying the minimal amount to countries left to deal with the burden of death and disease caused by its products”.74
In 2022, the Tobacco Control Research Group at the University of Bath issued two research briefings on the convoluted structure of subsidiary companies used by PMI75 and BAT76 to avoid taxation. Evidence allegedly shows that PMI channels significant amounts of money through subsidiaries in Switzerland and the Netherlands, taking advantage of the financial secrecy and tax structures in these countries to minimise its tax liabilities.75 BAT allegedly uses multiple subsidiaries in the UK, known as the Weston companies, which appear to be shell companies as they have no employees. This web of subsidiaries appears to allow BAT to transfer funds to and from other markets, to similarly minimise its tax liabilities. BAT has not paid a significant amount of profit-based tax in the UK since 2010.76
i Transactional integrity refers to whether the company in question adheres to the legal and moral framework of the society within which it operates, such as by acting transparently, keeping its promises, and behaving fairly and with consistency. The authors of the paper listed as reference 7 observe that many would contend that the tobacco industry does not currently fulfil even this more limited (‘transactional’) definition of corporate social responsibility.
ii Exceptions were made for some events. See Chapter 11 for further information.
iii Funds raised by Red Nose Day support counselling services, research and education into sudden infant death syndrome. See: http://www.rednoseday.com.au/. Exposure to cigarette smoke, before and after birth, is a cause of SIDS. See Chapter 3, Section 8.2.
iv Kraft is now an independent publicly held company.
v The following organisations are listed: Mission Australia, Conservation Volunteers Australia, Westpac Lifesaver Rescue Helicopter, Northcott, and Assistance Dogs Australia
vi Smoking is a cause of cataract and is a major risk factor for developing age-related macular degeneration, both of which may result in blindness. See Chapter 3, Section 10.
vii See: https://www.pmi.com/sustainability/giving-back-wherever-we-are
viii Kraft Foods, like Philip Morris International, now operates separately from Altria and Philip Morris (USA).
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References
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