10.9 Retailer experiences of and attitudes towards selling tobacco

Tobacco retailers have important relationships with both the suppliers and consumers of tobacco products. With most forms of marketing long-banned in Australia, for decades, manufacturers have focused promotion efforts inside the retail environment. In 1996—well before point-of-sale advertising and display bans were implemented—a Philip Morris executive describing the Australian market noted ‘the primary point of communication between ourselves and our consumers will be inside a retailer outlet’ and that ‘contracting for display [and] partnerships with retailers’ were new marketing priorities.^{1 p.96-97} While large retail channels such as supermarkets account for the majority of the volume tobacco sales (see Section 10.8), a large proportion of all tobacco retailers are smaller outlets, such as corner stores (also called milk bars or delis in Australia). These low-volume but numerous retail outlets contribute to the widespread availability of tobacco in the community.

Numerous types of tobacco control regulations directly affect tobacco retailing, including retail licensing schemes, tax increases, product display and promotion bans or conditions, packaging changes, and sales to minors restrictions. Retailers are also indirectly affected by wider advertising and promotion bans, where these increasing restrictions have led to a greater investment from tobacco companies in marketing activities and price promotions in the retail setting.^2-4 The role of retail in providing widespread access to and promotion of tobacco products, the effects of high tobacco retail density and licensing schemes, relevant regulatory information, and public support for regulation is described in Section 11.9.

This section focuses on retailer experiences with selling tobacco and tobacco industry and retailer alliances. In this section ‘retailer’ is a general term used to refer to the retail store, not necessarily individuals who work in stores that sell tobacco.

10.9.1 The value of tobacco sales to retailers

The value of tobacco sales in driving footfall—where tobacco attracts customers to the store who also purchase other products, thereby increasing overall sales—is commonly reported by retailers, and tobacco industry groups.^5-9 Some retailers start or continue to sell tobacco despite low profits due to the perceived risk of loss of custom if they did not sell tobacco. This idea is promoted to retailers by tobacco industry representatives.⁸ Studies of retailer perceptions find retailers reporting low profit from tobacco sales but high footfall from offering tobacco, stating that customers often also buy other items with their tobacco products.^9,10 However, independent research examining whether tobacco sales actually drive footfall and higher spending in retail stores contradicts this idea.

One large UK study found that, on average, spending on non-tobacco products (which tend to have a higher product margin for retailers than tobacco products) is about the same regardless of whether the customer purchased tobacco in the same transaction or not. Further, about 79% of transactions did not include tobacco products, compared to only 13% that included a mix of tobacco products and other items, and 8% of purchases only tobacco products. It was concluded that most items that small retailers sell drive footfall: tobacco does not uniquely contribute to patronage.⁵ The study also reported that the average profit on tobacco products was 6%, compared to 24% for non-tobacco products; therefore even with high volumes of sales, tobacco accounted for only 1.6% of total sales income.

Customer intercept studies from Australia,¹¹ the US¹² and New Zealand^13,14 have shown very similar results. A Western Australian study that surveyed customers of small tobacco retailers in low socio-economic areas found that only 8% of customers purchased tobacco products, with just 3% visiting the store for the primary purpose of buying tobacco. Customers who purchased tobacco were no more likely to make additional spontaneous purchases, compared to those who did not purchase tobacco.¹¹ Examination of receipts from customers from US urban corner stores found that 87% of all purchases did not include tobacco products.¹² Of the 13% of purchases that did include tobacco, 8% were tobacco only and 5% included tobacco and other consumables. This study focused on food and beverage purchases, finding no difference in the average amount spent on these types of items whether they were purchased with tobacco products or not.¹² Similarly, 86% of receipts examined in a similar customer intercept study outside convenience stores in New Zealand did not contain tobacco products, although this varied across retailers.¹⁴ Only 5% of all transactions contained tobacco and non-tobacco products. Customers who did not purchase tobacco products tended to spend more on non-tobacco items than those who also purchased tobacco items.

In a UK study⁷ of tobacco retailers from small stores—defined by physical store size of less than 280m²—in disadvantaged areas, the majority of the 62 retailers interviewed reported that tobacco sales were important or very important to them, and a perceived high reliance on tobacco for customer footfall. More than three-quarters of respondents reported making between 4-6% overall profit on tobacco sales, with greater profit levels reported from premium or non-price marked packs. However, 42% of retailers in this study reported an interest in reducing reliance on tobacco sales. Likewise, a New Zealand qualitative study with tobacco retailers found that several retailers reported making little or no profit from tobacco sales, but held a persistent belief that ceasing sales would reduce patronage.⁸ However, 62% of the 42 retailers interviewed stated that they would be willing contribute to reductions in tobacco use—although how so was not specified.

10.9.2 Negative aspects of tobacco sales

Given the high monetary value of tobacco products and their ease of trade, risk of theft is of concern to many retailers, particularly smaller stores and/or those with extended trading hours.^9,15,16 Concerns about higher insurance costs against the theft of tobacco products has been reported in one Australian qualitative study of tobacco retailers.¹⁵ Major retailer chains in the US have also cited concerns about theft in their decision to cease tobacco sales, in addition to low profit margins and high labour costs to manage stock and sales.^17,18 Further, profit margins from tobacco products are often lower than for other fast-moving consumer goods.^5,7 The increasing shift toward budget (low-cost) brands and price discounting may act to further reduce the profitability of tobacco for retailers.⁷

Large tobacco displays or stocking a diverse range of products means a substantial amount of cash is tied up in tobacco products.^4,5,15 Rooke (2010) notes how one UK retailer described being fully stocked as having “£3000 of dead cash”.^{4 p.282} This study also noted that entering into incentive agreements may force retailers to carry more stock than they would otherwise choose to. While tobacco companies may insist that retailers carry a large range of brands,¹⁹ research by ASH UK⁵ showed that lost sales due to keeping a smaller range of stock would be minimal.

10.9.3 Experiences of retailers who have stopped selling tobacco

Several studies have explored the reasons why retailers stop selling tobacco. Financial-related reasons, such as declining sales and minimal profits, or the increasing effort required to comply with tobacco control legislation have been frequently cited by retailers. Additionally, personal values and health concerns have been named as reasons why retailers stop selling tobacco.^{8,9,15,16,20,21}

A 2019 study explored why retailers in Victoria, New South Wales, and Western Australia stopped selling tobacco. This study found that retailers who had stopped selling tobacco were most commonly newsagents/post offices and alcohol-licensed premises.⁹ Of the retailers that had stopped selling tobacco, 27.7% mentioned that the minimal profits provided by tobacco was the number one reason for stopping sales. In 2019, Western Australia was the only state in the study with a fee-based licensing scheme. Approximately, 12.5% of retailers in this state who had stopped selling tobacco named licencing as a primary reason for doing so. In Victoria and New South Wales, 19.4% and 19.8% of retailers respectively, cited the risk of break-ins and theft of tobacco as a primary reason for stopping sales.⁹ Table 10.9.1 describes the reasons why Australian retailers have stopped selling tobacco in further detail.

A New South Wales study of retailers who had stopped selling tobacco found that the types of stores that ceased sales were more likely to be low-volume outlets, particularly alcohol licensed premises.¹⁵ This study revealed a range of contributing factors to the decision to stop selling, including high stock-keeping costs but low profits, and low sales. However, for most retailers interviewed, a further event or factor on top of these economic factors prompted the decision to cease sales. These included owner-initiated changes to the business, concerns about security, or changes to the tobacco retail regulatory environment.¹⁵

Similarly, a study conducted in Tasmania found that 75% of retailers who had stopped selling tobacco did so because of business-related reasons.²¹ This included things like the low profitability of tobacco, and the cost of licence fees and insurance premiums. The regulatory obligations for selling tobacco such as the requirement to hold a licence, policing the minimum age of purchase, and complying with display restrictions were also named as reasons for stopping the sale of tobacco. Some retailers also noted that they had stopped selling tobacco due to ethical and health concerns.²¹

10.9.4 Relationship between retailers and the tobacco industry

Tobacco manufacturers and distributors make significant efforts to establish and maintain relationships with retailers.^3,22 These efforts seek to ensure particular products are stocked and (where point-of-sale marketing is allowed) secure prominent display of these products. Tobacco suppliers often compete for brand dominance in retailers, as customers often assume the brand displayed most prominently is most popular.³ Establishing ongoing relationships, particularly with retail chains and large-volume retailers, can be highly valuable to tobacco suppliers.³

Australian studies have noted the main channels through which the tobacco industry acts to establish and maintain relationships with retailers.^1,23,24 First, the tobacco industry engages in ‘trade promotional expenditure’, or retailer incentives and payments—see Section 10.9.4.1 below. Second, retailers provide tobacco display unit hardware and promotional materials, and tailored advice on what to stock and how it should be displayed to maximise sales in the local area. Third, tobacco companies engage strategic efforts to build alliances with retailers, providing information to retailers, creating a sense of corporate identity, and recruiting retailers as political allies to oppose tobacco control legislation—see Section 10.9.5. Fourth, tobacco companies regularly promote their brands in retail trade publications, creating brand prominence, reinforcing brand identities, and informing retailers about new products and their unique selling points.

Tobacco suppliers foster relationships with retailers through in-store visits. A review of tobacco industry documents relating to tobacco retail revealed that “sales representatives were among the most important members of their organisations, and as a result, a great deal of time and effort was invested in training sales representatives”.^{3 p.379} Sales representatives were responsible for securing product prominence, offering ‘merchandising programs’, persuading retailers to switch from competitor’s incentive programs, negotiating individualised contracts with retailers, and checking retailers were complying with the terms of their agreements with the supplier.³

A 2016 survey of 591 tobacco retailers in the UK found that tobacco industry representatives frequently visit tobacco retailers.⁵ Almost 7% received weekly visits from representatives, 38% received a visit at least once a month, and a further 37% received visits at least every six months. At least half of all surveyed retailers reported having conversations about the following in the past six months: what brands should be stocked, where stock should be positioned, plain packaging, which brands should be promoted to customers, stocking e-cigarette brands from that tobacco representative’s company, and how to talk to customers about brand promotions.⁵ In the same survey, similar proportions of retailers responded that they agreed (46%) and disagreed (41%) that tobacco companies have the ‘best interests of retailers at heart’.

A review of tobacco industry retail practices found that contract enforcement was a significant component of the role of sales representatives in the US.³ Philip Morris protocols instructed representatives to withhold monthly payments if any of a raft of conditions were not met, including non-display or obstruction of key signage or merchandise, products not display as per the provided planogram, display of competitors’ merchandise, “refusal to accept promotions or misuse of Philip Morris promotions”, and “non-acceptance of new brands”.^{3 p.382}

Tobacco company representatives can also serve as a source of information to retailers about policies that affect their businesses.^10,25 A 2015 Californian study of 252 tobacco retailers found that 68% of retailers cited tobacco companies as a usual source of information about tobacco control regulations, 35% cited retail trade associations, and only 24% named government agencies as a usual source of information.²⁵

10.9.4.1 Retailer incentives and payments

There is considerable international evidence that “tobacco industry involvement and control in the retail space is significant and entrenched”.^p.283 However, the proportion of stores with these arrangements, let alone the value of these agreements, is largely unknown.^3,22,26 Studies from the US from 1999 to 2002 suggest that fees to retailers for stocking particular brands and other discounts totalled around US$2500, on average.²⁷ A 1999 study showed that small retailers in California were far more likely to receive incentives to stock or display tobacco products, and be offered trade allowances, than other types of consumables such as soft drinks, candy, snack foods, and alcohol. The amount paid to retailers for stocking and displaying tobacco products was substantially higher than for any other type of product. A further Californian study found around two-thirds of a sample of almost 500 tobacco retailers participated in retail incentive programs.²⁸ Unsurprisingly, stores that participated had greater qualities and prominence of promotional tobacco materials. There was also a tendency for these stores to offer cheaper cigarette prices than those who did not participate in incentive schemes for one of the two brands examined.

Other studies, primarily from the US, UK, and New Zealand, have identified the different types of incentive schemes that may be offered, in terms of the promotional practices requested by tobacco companies and the reward provided in exchange. Information from Australia is limited, however, a 2020 study found that around one third of retailers were offered an incentive or a benefit from a tobacco company. These commonly included price discounts, rebates, and gifts, as well as free stock, accessories and cash. In return, tobacco companies gained greater prominence on price lists, in tobacco cabinets and influence over product ranges and stock levels.²⁴

10.9.4.1.1 Incentivised practices

The types of activities that may be incentivised vary from simply stocking a particular brand or displaying a manufacturer’s brands prominently, to encouraging retailers to verbally promote certain products. These activities are described below, based on broad categories identified by Stead et al. (2017) in a study with small tobacco retailers in Scotland. In that study, Stead and colleagues also noted how various incentive arrangements were impacted by recently introduced point-of-sale display bans. 

• Retaining the tobacco unit: In which the tobacco company supplies, maintains, and updates the tobacco unit in exchange for continued stocking of that manufacturer’s products (and display of products, pre display bans). Incentives may also be offered for maintaining the display or arrangement of stock in a prescribed way.⁴
• Maintaining brand availability: These schemes included offering rewards for maintaining continuous stock of particular products. Notably, Stead et al. (2017)¹⁹ found that some retailers reported that meeting these targets was easier following point-of-sale display bans, as the only requirement was to have particular products in stock, not to display the products in a particular format or minimum quantity (as was the case pre-display ban).
• Positioning: Incentives provided in exchange for prime position in the tobacco displays.¹⁹ These are also referred to as ‘slotting allowances’. Stead et al (2017)¹⁹ reported that even though tobacco products were not visible to consumers following the display ban, some sales representatives continued to request particular product arrangements, such as exclusive use of the top-most or eye-level shelves within the tobacco unit. Retailers speculated this was to maintain brand prominence when the tobacco cupboard was open.
• Point-of-purchase allowances: Payments in exchange for displaying promotional materials at the point of sale.²⁶
• Sales or volume incentives: Incentives in the form of bonuses or points earned when sales targets are achieved.^19,22 Retailers may be asked to retain outer packaging, or barcodes from outer packaging, as proof of sales in order to redeem these incentives.¹⁹ Similarly, ‘trade allowances’ are discounts or bonus products received for ordering specific quantities of product.²⁶ In the US, various tobacco companies have offered retailers ‘sliding scale’ volume-based incentives, with the value of the incentive increasing as sales volume thresholds were achieved.³
• Trialling new stock and specific product promotions: Some retailers have reported incentive offers for trialling new products or achieving sales volumes of a particular product, with retailers often encouraged to verbally promote these products to customers (see also below).¹⁹
• Promoting products to customers: UK retailers have also reported being incentivised to verbally recommend particular products to consumers.¹⁹ In these instances, the retailer was informed that a mystery shopper would visit their store and ask for a competitor’s brand. If the retailer offered the promoted brand at a specified price, they would receive a £100 reward. Other sales techniques suggested by tobacco company representatives included placing new products next to the price signs of other low-cost products, and ‘mistakenly’ retrieving the promoted product instead of the one asked for by the customer.¹⁹

10.9.4.1.2 Types of incentives offered

The various types of incentives or rewards that may be offered to retailers are summarised below. These may be offered under contracts with the tobacco company or supplier, or under ‘partnership’ or ‘loyalty’ programs.^19,22 Individually-tailored contracts with suppliers are common in the US,²² often in the form of fixed monthly payments.³ These contracts may even specify the price at which particular products are to be sold. Loyalty schemes appear to be more common in the UK, and are associated with frequent (often monthly) visits from sales representatives, particularly from stores with industry-funded product displays.⁴ A 2006 examination of tobacco industry retail practices in the US revealed that, as competition between tobacco companies for retail prominence increased, the fees paid to retailers escalated without corresponding increases in sales.³ The point-of-sale environment also became cluttered with tobacco merchandise and promotion. This led to a shift toward sales volume-based incentive programmes.³

• Cash incentives: Offered as bonus payments for achieving sales volumes or meeting prescribed promotional display or placement requirements.^4,22 Conversely, bonus payments may be withheld if particular targets, such as stock-keeping thresholds, are not met.¹⁹
• Wholesale discounts or volume rebates: Stock offered at a discounted wholesale price for achieving sales volumes or other targets, or for ordering a minimum quantity of stock.^19,22
• Buydowns: This type of incentive scheme is common in the US.²² The tobacco company or wholesaler specifies a discount that existing inventory is to be sold at, promoted as a ‘cents off’ per pack sale. The retailer sells their existing stock at that price and is then reimbursed the discount on all packs sold at the end of the specified period. The retailer therefore bears the initial cost of the price discount for a lump sum at the end of the sale.²²
• Loyalty points: These programs involve point-earning systems redeemable for cash or other goods, hospitality, or business-related goods or equipment.^4,19 Philip Morris offered a loyalty program in Australia in 1995, where retailers earned ‘Longbeach Dollars’ that could be redeemed at auction events.¹
• Raffle systems: Stores that meet particular targets are entered into a prize draw. Rooke et al. (2010)⁴ reported on a raffle scheme in which first prize was a total store refurbishment.
• Free stock: May be provided when a retailer is asked to trial a new product,¹⁹ or for maintaining a product display.⁴
• Swapping old stock: A tobacco company may offer to exchange old, slow-moving stock for a new product under promotion.¹⁹
• Tobacco unit refurbishment: In addition to these ongoing arrangements, tobacco companies have reportedly covered the cost of complying with point-of-sale display bans, including entirely refurbishing the tobacco display area with concealed tobacco units.^5,19 This has also been observed in stores that have voluntarily concealed their tobacco displays.¹⁶

The Canadian province of Quebec introduced legislation banning payments, including rebates, gratuities or other incentives, from tobacco manufacturers to retailers from November 2017.²⁹ This includes benefits in relation to the sale and the retail price of tobacco products, and applies to all employees of tobacco retail outlets.

10.9.5 Retailer–industry alliances to oppose tobacco control legislation

In the face of increasing restrictions on tobacco marketing, the tobacco industry has a history of collaborating with the retail sector in opposing new policies to protect aligned economic interests.^1,25,30 In the 1950s-60s, when the serious health harms of tobacco were becoming public knowledge, the tobacco industry even published information in retail trade magazines counteracting or minimising these health concerns, encouraging retailers to repeat these reassurance messages to customers.³¹

Tobacco companies aggressively seek support from retailers, and provide retailers with the encouragement, tools, information, and financial support to involve themselves in policy debates.³⁰ For example, in the UK, retailers sent tens of thousands of “Not to plain packs” postcards—provided by tobacco manufacturer alliances—as submissions to the UK public consultation on plain packaging.⁷ Retailer associations have also acted, or been established, to promote the agenda of the tobacco industry.³⁰ These types of activity allow politicians to oppose anti-tobacco control legislation, without publicly aligning with the tobacco industry. Instead, they can be perceived as supporting local stores and retail groups, who do not have the tobacco industry’s extremely negative reputation.³⁰

A 2016 example of the industry seeking to recruit retailer support for opposing tobacco control regulations was described by Henriksen and Mahoney.³² The tobacco company Swedish Match and the National Association of Tobacco Outlets jointly established a website called Tobacco Ordinances–Take Another Look (T.O.T.A.L.). The website employs several common strategies to counter the proposed regulations. These include:

• Claiming insufficient evidence that the policy will have the desired outcome.
• Legal objections at many levels, including claiming the proposed measures are ‘unconstitutional’.
• Claiming regulatory redundancy, by arguing that existing regulations or industry practices adequately deal with the problem.
• Predicting negative unintended consequences will be caused by the policy. These include economic impacts (such as loss of revenue for the state and small business owners), adverse impacts on public health (such as the policy will actually increase consumption), that illicit trade will increase, and enforcement challenges.³²

The responses of retailers to tobacco control policies that may impact their businesses can be highly influential in policy debates,⁷ and these alliances have successfully shaped legislation. In 2011, a decision to reduce the sales tax on cigarettes in New Hampshire was based on a report from the New Hampshire Grocers Association, whose evidence was drawn from materials by tobacco industry allies.³⁰ The adverse impacts that new policies may cause to shops is frequently overstated by the tobacco industry and retailers. Tobacco control legislation  does not affect retailers to the extent that is claimed; people whose tobacco use declines spend their money on other products instead.³⁰ For example, tobacco tax increases, has been shown to have no impact on the overall  number of convenience stores or retail employment.³⁰     

ASH UK⁵ identifies three main avenues through which tobacco companies interact, and may seek to influence, small retailers: trade bodies and retail alliances, trade press, and visits from tobacco company representatives to retail stores. In particular, retail displays and promotions at the point-of-sale have been used by the tobacco industry as an avenue to develop relationships with retailers. As already discussed, retailers have been led to believe that their businesses will be harmed if they choose not to prominently display tobacco products. Retailers in England and the US have described relationships where manufacturers and suppliers were competing to exert control over their retail environment through a combination of contractual obligations, incentives, and pressure from company representatives concerning pricing, display, and other promotion of tobacco products.^4,22

Policies that may delay the service of customers, such as longer times spent looking for a specified pack following point-of-sale display bans or plain packaging, have been heavily criticised by retailers and industry.¹⁶ These arguments have particularly focused on negative impacts on small retailers, suggesting customers would become impatient and instead purchase at larger (cheaper) outlets. In the lead up to the introduction of plain packaging in Australia, tobacco industry-funded retailer groups claimed that the standardised packs would be difficult to differentiate, leading to significantly longer retrieval times for workers and the loss of frustrated and inconvenienced customers to other retail channels. For example, a report prepared by Deloitte for The Alliance of Australian Retailers (which was supported by British American Tobacco Australasia Limited, Philip Morris Limited, and Imperial Tobacco Australia Limited) estimated that the economic cost of plain packaging to convenience stores would be an additional 455–1,692 hours, or $9,000–$34,000 annually, with the largest component of this made up by the costs of increased transaction times ($7500–$27,000).³³ In reality, research following its introduction showed no lasting effects of plain packaging on retrieval times.^34-36

A detailed summary of the responses of retail groups and the tobacco industry to Australian plain packaging proposal, and analysis of the major arguments employed by these groups against plain packaging, is provided in Section 11A.2.

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